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AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT 
NASA 712, C O N V A I R  990, N712NA 
MARCH A I R  FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA 
JULY 17, 1985 
SYNOPSIS 
On Ju l y  17, 1985, a t  1810 P.d.t., NASA 712, a Convair 990 a i r c r a f t ,  was 
The re jec ted  
destroyed by f i r e  a t  March A l r  Force Base, C a l i f o r n i a .  
t h e  r o l l o u t  a f t e r  t h e  p i l o t  re jec ted  t h e  t a k e o f f  on runway 32. 
t a k e o f f  was i n i t i a t e d  dur ing  the t a k e o f f  r o l l  because o f  blown t i r e s  on the 
r i g h t  main land ing  gear. During t h e  r o l l o u t ,  fragments o f  e i t h e r  the  blown 
t i r e s  o r  the  wheel/brake assemblies penetrated a r i gh t -w ing  f u e l  tank forward 
o f  t he  r i g h t  main land ing  gear. Leaking f u e l  i g n i t e d  w h i l e  the  a i r c r a f t  was 
r o l l i n g ,  and f i r e  engul fed the  r i g h t  wing and fuselage a f t e r  t he  a i r c r a f t  was 
stopped on the  runway. The 4-man f l i g h t c r e w  and t h e  1 5  s c l e n t i s t s  and tech- 
n i c i a n s  seated i n  t h e  cabin evacuated the  a i r c r a f t  w i thou t  ser lous i n j u r y .  The 
f i r e  was no t  ext inguished by crash/ f i re / rescue e f f o r t s  and the  a i r c r a f t  was 
destroyed. 
The f i r e  s ta r ted  du r ing  
The NASA A i r c r a f t  Accident I n v e s t i g a t i o n  Board determined t h a t  t he  prob- 
ab le  cause o f  t he  acc ident  was the  near ly  simultaneous f a i l u r e  of the  two f r o n t  
t i r e s  on the  r i g h t  main land ing  gear a t  a c r i t i c a l  t i m e  du r ing  the  takeo f f  
r o l l .  These f a i l u r e s  resu l ted  i n  t h e  p i l o t ' s  dec i s ion  t o  r e j e c t  the  t a k e o f f .  
Con t r i bu t i ng  t o  the  seve r i t y  o f  the acc ident  was an in tense f i r e  fed by leakage 
f rom the  puncture o f  a r ight -wing f u e l  tank forward o f  t h e  r i g h t  main gear; t he  
puncture occurred dur ing  the  i n t e n t i o n a l  extended r o l l o u t  o f  t h e  a i r c r a f t .  
1.0 FACTUAL INFORMATION 
1.1 H i s t o r y  o f  t h e  F l i g h t  
On Ju l y  17, 1985, a t  1000 P.d.t.l, NASA 712, a Convair 990 (CV-990) 
t u r b o j e t  a i r c r a f t  operated by the NASA Ames Research Center (ARC), M o f f e t t  
F i e l d ,  Mountain V iew,  Ca l i f o rn ia ,  departed i t s  home base f o r  March A i r  Force 
Base (AFB), Rivers ide,  Ca l i f o rn ia ,  t o  support a s c i e n t i f i c  f l i g h t  l a t e r  i n  the  
day. The a i r c r a f t  landed a t  1100; no s i g n i f i c a n t  d iscrepancies were noted 
du r ing  the  f l i g h t .  
m iss ion  area, 18" no r th  l a t i t u d e .  The a i r c r a f t  was scheduled t o  take o f f  a t  
1800 f o r  a 6-hour f l i g h t  under instrument f l i g h t  r u l e s  ( I F R )  t o  observe a man- 
made barium comet t r a i l .  The a i r c r a f t  f l i g h t c r e w  consis ted o f  t w o  p i l o t s ,  a 
f l i g h t  engineer, and a nav igator .  F i f t e e n  s c i e n t i s t s  and techn ic ians  were 
onboard t o  operate the  experimental equipment. 
The f l i g h t  pos i t ioned the  a i r c r a f t  c lose r  t o  the  intended 
While the  f l i g h t c r e w ,  the  sc ien t i s t s ,  and the  techn ic ians  res ted  a t  a 
l o c a l  m o t e l ,  a maintenance t h r o u g h f l i g h t  check was completed on the  a i r c r a f t  
by Northrop Services cont rac tor  personnel. The on ly  discrepancy noted was a 
minor c u t  on the  t read  o f  t i r e  7 ( f i g .  1) .  The cu t  was c i r c l e d  w i t h  ye l l ow  
1 A l l  t i m e s  a re  P a c i f i c  day l i gh t  saving t ime based on the  24-hour c lock .  
chalk  and determined t o  be w i t h i n  normal opera t ing  to lerances.  This same 
c l r c l e d  c u t  was l a t e r  found on a p iece  o f  t i r e  carcass du r ing  the  runway exam- 
i n a t i o n .  The c u t  was s t i l l  w i t h i n  acceptable l i m i t s .  The main gear t i r e  pres- 
sures were checked i n  accordance w i t h  standard ARC p r a c t i c e  and repor ted t o  be 
w i t h i n  the  normal range, 165 t o  170 p s i .  The t i r e  pressures were n o t  recorded 
on the  a i r c r a f t ' s  malntenance forms s ince t h e r e  was no requirement t o  do so. 
ARC p o l i c y  l l m i t e d  the  maximum ramp weight o f  t h e  a i r c r a f t  t o  240,000 
pounds. Northrop malntenance personnel s ta ted  t h a t  t he  a i r c r a f t  had 89,700 
pounds o f  f u e l  onboard be fore  engine s t a r t  as i n d i c a t e d  on the  a i r c r a f t  f u e l  
gauges. This establ lshed an a i r c r a f t  ramp weight o f  232,500 pounds. I n  post -  
acc ident  i n te rv iews  the crew s ta ted  t h a t  they had ca l cu la ted  a dec i s ion  speed 
V1 o f  151 knots,  a r o t a t l o n  speed VR o f  154 knots,  and an i n i t i a l  c l imb 
speed V2 o f  167 knots. March AFB runway 32 i s  13,300 f e e t  long, and the 
ba lanced- f ie ld  length was ca lcu la ted  t o  be 10,500 f e e t .  The takeo f f  engine 
pressure r a t i o  (EPR) power s e t t i n g  was 1.87. 
g r a v i t y  was 23.4 percent o f  mean aerodynamic chord (MAC), which was w i t h i n  
l i m l t s .  The i n v e s t i g a t i o n  team confirmed these f i g u r e s  as c o r r e c t  f o r  t he  
meteoro log ica l  condi t ions a t  the  t ime o f  t he  acc ident .  
The a i r c r a f t  t a k e o f f  cen ter  o f  
The a i r c r a f t  commander occupied the  r i g h t  seat.  The p i l o t  occupied the  
l e f t  seat and was operat ing the con t ro l s .  
was w i thou t  i n c i d e n t  u n t i l  a 14thump11 was h e a r d / f e l t  i n  t he  cabin by those 
f a m i l i a r  w i t h  the  a i r c r a f t .  Subsequent d iscuss ion a t t r i b u t e d  the  "thump" t o  
the  a i r - c o n d i t l o n i n g  system. 
t h e  "thump" bu t  had not discussed i t . 
The engine s t a r t  was normal. Taxi  
The cockp i t  crew s ta ted  t h a t  they had a l s o  noted 
The a i r c r a f t  was c leared onto runway 32 by March AFB tower t o  ho ld  i n  
t a k e o f f  p o s i t i o n .  A t  1806, NASA 712 was c leared  f o r  t akeo f f  by the  tower con- 
t r o l l e r  w l t h  t h e  f i n a l  i n s t r u c t i o n  "change t o  departure,  c leared  f o r  t akeo f f . "  
The crew s e t  t he  radios t o  the  depar ture frequency, and the  p i l o t  advanced the  
t h r o t t l e s  and checked the  engines a t  an in te rmed ia te  power s e t t i n g .  A f t e r  t he  
engine checks he released the  brakes and advanced the  t h r o t t l e s  t o  t h e  1.87 EPR 
s e t t i n g .  
The f l i g h t c r e w  stated t h a t  every th ing  was normal i n  the  cockp i t  du r ing  
the  f i r s t  p a r t  o f  the takeo f f  r o l l .  However, t he  occupants o f  t he  cab in  and 
several  witnesses outside the  a i r c r a f t  noted abnormal i t ies .  A technic ian,  
watching a t e l e v i s i o n  monl tor  l i n k e d  t o  a camera focused on t i r e  3, no t iced  
deformat ion o f  t he  t i r e .  Another techn ic ian  occupying a r i g h t - s i d e  cabin seat 
a f t  o f  the  wlng had a f l e e t i n g  percept ion  o f  a "b lack ob jec t  f l y i n g  over the  
wing." An ou ts ide  witness made a s i m i l a r  comment. 
pos i t i oned  about 2 mi les f rom the  a i r c r a f t ,  no t iced  wh i te  smoke coming from 
the  a i r c r a f t  underside e a r l y  i n  the  takeof f  r o l l .  
these abnormal i t ies  I n  the  cockp i t ,  nor  d i d  the  cab in  occupants r e l a y  t h e i r  
observat ions t o  t h e  f l i gh tc rew.  
Other witnesses, who were 
There was no i n d i c a t i o n  of 
A s  t h e  a i r c r a f t  accelerated, t h e  p i l o t  heard t w o  r a p i d  exp los ive  bangs 
The a i r c r a f t  commander, who was 
and immediately f e l t  a "k ind  o f  qu i ve r ing  of t he  a i r c r a f t . "  The cockp i t  vo ice 
recorder  (CVR) recorded two almost slmultaneous exp los lve  sounds. The f l i g h t -  
crew recognized t h e  sound as a blown t i r e .  
respons ib le  f o r  c a l l i n g  the  speeds t o  the  p i l o t ,  r e c a l l e d  seeing the  a i rspeed 
i n d i c a t o r  pass 140 knots. The f l i g h t  engineer r e c a l l e d  "seeing a speed o f  135 
t o  140 knots."  Several technic ians I n  t h e  cabin were i n  the  h a b i t  o f  moni tor -  
i n g  and cross-checking I n e r t i a l  ground speed readouts, and they r e c a l l e d  a 
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reading of 144 knots at the time of the explosions. 
(FDR) indicated that 143 knots was the maximum speed attained, a velocity of 
about 242 feet per second. The CVR indicated that the aircraft commander 
called out "abort," almost simultaneously with the flight engineer's call of 
"blown tire." A rejected takeoff (RTO) was begun. The pilot closed the power 
levers, deployed the spoilers, and selected reverse thrust on all four engines. 
Being aware that the runway at March AFB was 13,300 feet long (2,800 feet 
longer than the calculated balanced-field length), the pilot informed the crew 
that he was going to "stay off the brakes." In later interviews the pilot 
stated that he used light braking during the rollout. During the first phase 
of the RTO the aircraft swerved slightly to the right, and the pilot acted to 
bring the aircraft back toward the runway centerline. He further stated that 
during the rollout he had difficulty steering with the nose wheel and recalled 
thinking that the nose wheel tires may have blown out. The remainder of the 
cockpit crew and one technician seated forward in the cabin stated that the 
pilot appeared to have difficulty with directional control using the nose wheel 
steerlng. In addition, the aircraft commander stated that he was not holding 
the control yoke forward durlng the rollout. 
The flight data recorder 
Nine seconds after the first explosions, another bang was heard by the 
flightcrew and recorded on the CVR. The flight engineer stated "blew another 
one." Five seconds later the CVR recorded the application of reverse thrust. 
As reverse thrust was being applled, another bang was recorded on the CVR but 
was not noticed by the fllghtcrew. 
not sure on which side the tires had blown but, based on the sound, thought 
that they were on the left side. 
During the rollout the pilot stated he was 
The tower controller perceived the aircraft to be in distress and in the 
process of aborting after about 6,000 feet of takeoff roll. The controller 
tried to contact NASA 712 on tower frequency. The flightcrew did not receive 
the transmission since they had changed to Ontario departure control frequency 
before beginning the takeoff roll and were not monitoring tower frequency on 
any of the three radios. The tower controller later noted flames on the air- 
craft and immediately activated the primary crash network. 
The pilot reduced reverse thrust on all engines after the flight engineer 
called 113,000,1t as recorded on the CVR. Approaching the end of the runway and 
without knowledge of a fire, the pilot started a right turn toward the last 
taxiway in an attempt to clear the runway. After hearing a call of "fire on 
the right side" from the technicians in the cabin area, the pilot Immediately 
brought the aircraft to a stop at about 12,700 feet. The engines were shut 
down by using the emergency shutdown handles. The aircraft commander released 
his seatbelt and shoulder harness and opened the right cockpit window to assess 
the situatlon. He noted fire near the right landing gear and raw fuel pouring 
out of the wing in front of the right landing gear and immediately ordered the 
flightcrew to evacuate the aircraft. 
The 15 cabin occupants, being aware of the fire before the flightcrew, 
had started preparing for evacuatlon before the alrcraft came to a stop. Since 
the fire was on the right side, the left-side emergency evacuation slldes were 
deployed - one at the front exit and one at the rear exit. Although there were 
minor problems with the deployment and operation of the slides, the entire 
crew exited safely. 
After the evacuatlon, all crewmembers and occupants assembled at a safe 
3 
distance from the a i rc raf t  and awaited the a r r iva l  of the crash/fire/rescue 
( C F R )  equipment. 
fuel pouring from a right-wing tank i n  f ront  of the r i g h t  main landing gear. 
The crewmembers and other witnesses described i t  as a "column of f i r e . "  The 
r ight  wing and the fuselage were completely destroyed by the f i r e .  
They noted tha t  the f i r e  was fed by a large column of ignited 
The accident occurred during daylight hours, about 1810 a t  3 3 O  52.8'  north 
la t i tude  and 117" 1 5 . 5 '  west longitude. 
was 1,537 f ee t  mean sea level (m.s .1.)  
The elevation of the accident s i t e  
1 . 2  Injur ies  t o  Persons 
None of the four crewmembers nor the 15  sc i en t i s t s  and technicians on 
board were injured. Two f i re f igh ters  were s l igh t ly  injured while attempting 
t o  extinguish the f i r e .  
1 .3  Damage t o  Aircraft 
The a i r c r a f t  fuselage and right wing were consumed by the f i r e .  The 
a i r c r a f t  was destroyed. 
1 . 4  Other Damage 
To meet research mission requirements, the NASA CV-990 a i r c r a f t  cabin was 
extensively equipped w i t h  electronic equipment used i n  a variety of s c i en t i f i c  
f l i g h t  research programs. A l l  of t h i s  equipment was destroyed. The portland 
cement concrete ( P C C )  surface on the departure end of runway 32 a t  the a i r -  
c r a f t  stop p o i n t  was s ignif icant ly  damaged. 
1 .5  Personnel Information 
The flightcrew were a l l  properly cer t i f ied  and trained for  the f l i g h t  
(appendix A ) .  
on safety and evacuation procedures. 
The 15 s c i en t i s t s  and technicians onboard had a l l  been briefed 
1 .6  Aircraft  Information 
The a i r c r a f t  was operated and maintained as a public a i r c r a f t  i n  accord- 
ance w i t h  Ames Research Center guidelines and procedures. 
performed by Northrop Services under contract t o  A R C  (appendix 8) .  
The maintenance was 
1.6.1 Tire service history.  - The wheel, brake, and t i r e  positions on 
the CV-990 main landing gear were designated by number, l e f t  t o  r i g h t ,  begin- 
ning w i t h  the forward t i r e s  ( f i g .  1 ) .  Nos. 1 and 2 were the forward positions 
of the l e f t  main gear; nos. 3 and 4 were the forward positions of the right 
main gear; nos. 5 and 6 were the rear or a f t  positions of the l e f t  main gear; 
and nos. 7 and  8 were the a f t  positions of the r ight  main gear. The nose 
t i r e s ,  wheels, and  brakes were Identified as l e f t  and r ight .  . 
The t i r e  ( 2 4  p l y )  i n  the no. 3 position was 1 2  years o l d  and on i t s  s ixth 
retread cycle; the t i r e  ( 2 2  p l y )  i n  the no. 4 position was missing a d i g i t  
from i t s  s e r i a l  number, making the year of manufacture (1973 or 1983) indeter- 
minate. However, since t h i s  t i r e  was on i t s  fourth retread i n  1984, i t  was 
most l ikely manufactured i n  1973. The t i r e  ( 2 4  p l y )  i n  the no. 7 position was 
1 2  years o l d  and on i t s  fourth retread; and the t i r e  ( 2 2  p l y )  i n  the no. 8 
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Figure 1. - Positions of t i re  and wheel assemblies on CV-990 main 
landing gear. 
p o s i t i o n  was 9 years o l d  and on I t s  second ret read.  Ne i ther  NASA nor ARC have 
es tab l i shed p o l i c y  r e l a t i v e  t o  age and number o f  re t read  cyc les (appendix B) .  
T i r e s  a re  declared serv iceable by v i s u a l  inspect ion.  
Ground crew in te rv iews  establ ished t h a t  t he  t i r e s  were Inspected be fore  
t a k e o f f  and determined t o  be serv iceable i n  accordance w i th  ARC p o l i c y .  The 
ground crew s ta ted  t h a t  a l l  t i r e  pressures were normal bu t  were n o t  recorded 
s ince i t  i s  no t  ARC p o l i c y  t o  record t i r e  pressure readings. 
1.6.2 T i r e  examination. - The NASA A i r c r a f t  Accident I n v e s t i g a t i o n  Board 
c o l l e c t e d  the f a i l e d - t i r e  fragments f rom the  runway and pieced them together  
f o r  i t s  on -s i t e  Inspec t ion  and evaluat ion.  I n  add i t i on ,  t he  Board c a l l e d  i n  
M r .  Stephen N. Bobo o f  the  U.S. Department o f  Transpor tat ion,  Research, and 
Specia l  Programs Admin is t ra t ion,  Transpor ta t ion  Systems Center, and M r .  George 
P h i l i p o f f ,  Thompson A i r c r a f t  T i r e  Corp., f o r  he lp  i n  determin ing t h e  sequence 
and cause o f  t he  t i r e  f a i l u r e s .  They conducted on-s i te  analyses and c o l l e c t e d  
specimens f o r  l abo ra to ry  t e s t i n g .  
The on-s i te  examinations o f  the  assembled f a i l e d - t i r e  fragments (such as 
shown i n  f i g .  2) revealed the fo l l ow ing  in fo rmat ion :  None o f  the  t i r e  pieces 
recovered showed evidence o f  t h e  c l a s s i c  s igns o f  overdef lec t ion ,  such as 
creas ing o f  the  inner  l i n e r ,  and no l a t e n t  defects  were found i n  any t i r e .  
T i r e  3 was the  f i r s t  t o  begin fragmenting. Por t ions o f  t h e  cas ing recovered 
f r o m  the  runway s t i l l  had t read  rubber attached, suggest ing t h a t  t he  f a i l u r e  
probably o r i g i n a t e d  i n  the  casing s t ruc tu re .  Although rubber and ny lon  age 
q u i t e  s lowly  under favorab le  condj t lons,  some embr i t t lement  o f  t he  ma te r ia l s  
does occur, and t h i s  might be g rea t l y  accelerated by h igh  temperatures and 
exposure t o  t he  elements. Durometer hardness readings were taken a t  severa l  
l oca t i ons  on the  t read  o f  a l l  f o u r  t i r e s  w i t h  a Shore A-Scale meter. The 
h ighes t  hardness readlngs were on t i r e s  3 and 7, each 12 years o l d .  T i r e  4 
showed evidence of considerable overheating, w i t h  s idewal l  ma te r ia l  con ta in ing  
melted nylon, b a l l e d  f l laments ,  and hard brushy ends. Most o f  t he  exposed 
t i r e  rubber exh ib i t ed  the  b lue  blush o f  ant iozonant wax exudate, a s ign  o f  
overheat ing.  T i r e  4 fragments showed the  c l a s s i c  " X "  break u s u a l l y  a t t r i b u t e d  
t o  ca tas t roph ic  blowout f a i l u r e .  No evidence o f  f a i l u r e  f r o m  f o r e i g n  ob jec t  
damage was found. 
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IC) l i r e  7 - left rear. 
(b) Tire 4 - right front. 
( d l l i r e  8 - r i g h t  rear. 
Figure 2. -Assembled fraqments of r i a h t  main gear t i res  f rom NASA 712. found  on runway 32 at March  A i r  Force Base, CalifOrnla. 
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1.7 Meteoroloqical Information 
The o f f i c i a l  March AFB 1755 weather observation was 10,000 f e e t  scat tered,  
15,000 f e e t  scattered,  estimated 20,000 f ee t  broken; v i s i b i l i t y ,  6 miles w i t h  
haze; temperature, 85 O F ;  dewpoint, 59 O F ;  w i n d ,  310° a t  4 knots; alt imeter 
se t t ing ,  29.92 inches of mercury. 
1.8 Aids t o  Navigation 
Not applicable. 
1 . 9  Communications 
No comnunications equipment d i f f i c u l t i e s  were reported. Interviews w i t h  
U.S.  Air Force personnel indicated tha t  a i r  t r a f f i c  control procedures a t  March 
A F B  were i n  accordance w i t h  the  FAA Air Traffic Control Handbook 7110.65 w i t h  
approved U.S. Air Force waivers. Chapter 3, Section 9 ,  of the FAA Handbook, 
Departure Control Instructions,  s t a t e s ,  
Inform departing I F R  ... a i r c r a f t  of the following: 
a .  Before takeoff- 
(1)  Issue the appropriate departure control frequency 
and beacon code ... 
( 2 )  Inform a l l  departing IFR mili tary turboprop/ 
turbojet  a i r c r a f t  (except transport  and cargo types) 
t o  change t o  departure control.  
control ler  has departure frequency override, transmit 
urgent instructions on t h i s  frequency. If the over- 
r ide capabili ty does not ex i s t ,  transmit urgent 
instructions on the emergency frequency. 
If the local 
b.  After takeoff- 
( 1 )  When the a i r c ra f t  i s  about 1 / 2  mile beyond the 
runway end, instruct c i v i l  a i r c r a f t  and mili tary 
transport  t o  contact departure control provided 
fur ther  communication w i t h  you  i s  not required. 
( 2 )  Do not request departing mil i tary turboprop/ 
turbojet  a i r c r a f t  (except transport  and cargo types) 
t o  make radio frequency or radar beacon changes before 
the a i r c r a f t  reaches 2,500 f ee t  above the surface. 
The March A F B  procedure tha t  calls  for  departing a i r c r a f t  t o  switch t o  depar- 
tu re  control frequency before s tar t ing takeoff was applied t o  NASA 712 .  
NASA 712 was equipped w i t h  three communications radios, two V H F  and one 
U H F .  Simultaneous transmission and reception was possible on any combination 
of the three radios. In addition, a third V H F  frequency could be preset  and 
stored for  rapid selection. The  flightcrew stated tha t  during the takeoff ro l l  
the no. 1 V H F  radio was se t  on a d i scre te  NASA ground crew frequency and the 
no. 2 V H F  radio was se t  on departure control frequency. The tower frequency 
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was set In the VHF preset stored position: The fllghtcrew indicated that the 
UHF radio was set on departure control frequexy with "guard" frequency being 
monitored. 
the no. 2 VHF radio to the UHF radio and transmitted that "NASA 712 is abort- 
ing." However, since the UHF was tuned to the Ontario departure control fre- 
quency, the tower dld not hear the transmission. 
The aircraft commander stated that during the RTO he switched from 
1-10 Aerodrome Information 
Runway 14/32 at March Air Force Base 1s hard surfaced, 13,300 feet long, 
and 300 feet wide. The runway surface was not grooved at the time of the 
event. The middle 75 feet are PCC and 112.5 feet on each side are asphaltic 
concrete. The approach end of runway 32 is at 1,490 feet m.s.l., and the 
departure end at 1,537 feet m.s.1. Runway 32 has an average uphill gradient 
of 0.004 toward the departure end. 
with the 2.4-mile NASA 712 aircraft taxi route and the 1.6-mile CFR response 
route. 
Figure 3 shows the March AFB airport layout 
1.11 Flight Recorders 
1.11.1 Cockpit voice recorder. - The aircraft was equipped with a Fair- 
A transcript made at the National Trans- 
child Model A-100 cockpit voice recorder. The tape was retrieved and the 
quality of the playback was normal. 
portation Safety Board's CVR laboratory is included as appendix C. 
1.11.2 Flight data recorder. - The aircraft was equipped with a Fairchild 
Hodel 5424 flight data recorder, serial no. 6180. The FDR was recovered and 
was sent to the Safety Board's Flight Recorder Laboratory In Washington, D.C., 
for examination and readout of the pertinent flight record. 
The recorder appeared to have been exposed to smoke only. The foil medium 
was removed in the normal manner, and examination disclosed no evidence of 
exposure to heat. All parameter and binary traces were present, and all were 
active with the exception of the radio binary traces, which showed no evidence 
of radio transmissions. The readout covered 4 minutes. The altitude informa- 
tion was based on the runway elevation of 1,488 feet corrected to mean sea 
level altitude. No corrections were made to any other parameter. 
This recorder receives altitude and airspeed information from the central 
air data computer instead of directly from the pitot and static systems. The 
airspeed stylus moves mechanically by a cam instead of directly by pitot/static 
pressures. Below 80 knots the stylus rides llhighll on the uncontrolled side of 
the cam since there is no set position. 
acceleration the system senses a pitot buildup and moves downward toward the 
80-knot point, the lowest point of stylus movement. No true speed value can 
be obtained until reaching this point. 
following the controlled side of the cam, and readings are then made of the 
indicated airspeed In the normal manner. The reverse is true during decelera- 
tion, with the airspeed dropping off. The stylus moves down the controlled 
side o f  the cam until it reaches the 80-knot point and then moves upward on 
the uncontrolled side until it reaches the Ilhighl' position. 
At some point during the takeoff 
The stylus then starts moving upward, 
The trace (fig. 4) indicates a steep slope moving downward from ''high" to 
80 knots and reverslng to a peak of 143 knots. 
toward the 80-knot point, passes 80 knots, and begins to move upward again 
It then begins to move downward 
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--- NASA 712 taxi route 
(distance. 2.4 miles) 
(distance. 1.6 miles) 
Firefighting equipment route ----- 
+ NASA 712 stop point 
Figure 3. - Layout of March A i r  Force Base a i rpor t  
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Figure 4 -Representation of indicated-airspeed trace from 
NASA 712 f l ight data recorder. 
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Figure 5. -T ime  histories of NASA 712 f l ight data recorder parameters du r ing  
rejected takeoff. Asterisks denote distance from runway 32 threshold. 
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toward ehigh.li This l a t t e r  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  t r a c e  i s  no t  as steep as the  begin- 
n i n g  po r t i on ,  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  dece le ra t ion  was slower than acce le ra t ion .  
Measurements suggest t h a t  t he  dece le ra t ion  r a t e  dur ing  t h e  RTO was approx i -  
mately ha l f  t h e  acce le ra t i on  ra te  du r ing  takeo f f  r o l l .  F igure  5 shows the  
t ime-h i s to ry  o f  t h e  airspeed data as w e l l  as the  v e r t i c a l  acce le ra t i on  and 
a i r c r a f t  heading v a r i a t i o n  dur ing t h e  i n c i d e n t .  
1.12 Runway Event Reconstruction 
The sequence o f  a i r c r a f t  accident events was reconst ructed by i d e n t i f y i n g  
t h e  debr is  and i t s  l o c a t i o n  on the runway ( f i g .  6)  along w i t h  marks made on 
t h e  runway surface p r i m a r i l y  by the t i r e  and wheel assemblies o f  t he  r i g h t  
main land ing  gear. Some debr is  had been i d e n t i f i e d ,  tagged, and removed from 
t h e  runway sur face by A i r  Force personnel before the  NASA A i r c r a f t  Accident 
I n v e s t i g a t i o n  Board began t h e i r  runway inspec t ion .  These t l r e  and wheel f rag -  
ments were made a v a i l a b l e  f o r  inspec t ion  by Board members. 
The f i r s t  marks found were wh i te  t i r e  scrub marks, caused by the  heavy 
a i r c r a f t  scrubbing black deposits o f f  the  PCC runway surface, t r a c k i n g  from 
taxiway 1 onto runway 32. The width o f  each mark and the  spacing between the 
marks o f  each land ing  gear were the same as the  dimensions o f  the  CV-990 a i r -  
c r a f t  ( f i g .  7 ) .  These whi te  t i r e  marks faded away as the  a i r p l a n e  entered t h e  
moderately t o  heav i l y  rubber contaminated area near t h e  runway c e n t e r l i n e  a t  
about 700 f ee t .2  The marks d i d  not  show evidence o f  dragging brakes o r  
under in f l a ted  t i r e s .  The f i r s t  t i r e  rubber shards were found a t  about 1,400 
f e e t  on the  r i g h t  s ide  o f  the cen te r l i ne  near the  a r r e s t i n g  gear cable 
( f i g .  6 (a ) ) .  A t  2,200 f e e t  and about 11 f e e t  r i g h t  o f  the  cen te r l i ne ,  f resh  
squ igg ly  rubber marks were found on the  rubber-coated PCC sur face i n  l i n e  w i t h  
the  est imated p o s i t i o n  o f  t i r e s  3 and 7. These wavy i n t e r m i t t e n t  rubber marks, 
v i s i b l e  f o r  about 400 f e e t  ( f i g .  8) ,  were l a t e r  associated w i t h  t i r e  3 by t read  
debr i s  found nearby. A l l  o f  the t i r e  fragments c o l l e c t e d  on the  runway between 
1,300 and 4,000 f e e t  were l a t e r  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  t i r e  3. Rubber marks were  
found on t h e  runway sur face a t  4,125 and 4,138 f e e t ,  i n d i c a t i n g  where t i r e  4 
and then t i r e  3 blew out.  V i s ib le  score marks ( f i g .  9 ) ,  s t a r t i n g  a t  about 
4,175 f e e t ,  showed where the  wheel f lange r i m s  o f  wheels 3 and 4 contacted the  
PCC surface. Fragments f rom the remainder o f  t i r e  3 and f r o m  t i r e  4 were  
sca t te red  over a l a r g e  p o r t i o n  of t h e  runway sur face between 4,000 and 
5,200 f e e t .  
The wheel r i m  marks on the  PCC sur face showed the  gradual r i g h t  d r i f t  o f  
t he  a i r c r a f t  as i t  t rave led  down t h e  runway. 
was 10 f e e t  r i g h t  o f  t he  runway cen te r l i ne .  Subsequent wheel marks showed a 
gradual t u r n  back toward the  runway c e n t e r l i n e  ( f i g .  6 ( a ) ) .  Wheel fragments 
f rom wheels 3 and 4 were found on t he  runway s t a r t i n g  a t  about 5,600 f e e t .  A 
fragment f rom the  wheel 4 i s  shown i n  f i g u r e  10.  Rubber marks on the  runway 
sur face a t  6,190 f e e t  i nd i ca ted  t i r e  8 blowout. Scuf f  marks on the  runway sur-  
face a t  7,300 f e e t  ( f i g .  11) ind ica ted  t i r e  7 blowout. A l a r g e  number o f  t i r e  
rubber and wheel fragments were found sca t te red  over the  runway from 7,100 t o  
8,400 f e e t .  
A t  about 5,665 f e e t  the  a i r c r a f t  
2A11 references t o  runway 32 d is tances a re  i n  f e e t  s t a r t i n g  a t  t he  
approach/takeoff  end ( 0  f t )  and progress ing t o  the  departure end (13,300 f t ) .  
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Figure 6. - Reconstruction of NASA 712 accident. Total runway width, 3GU ft with 75-ft PCC surface i n  center and 112.5-ft asphalt on both sides. 
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la) On runway 32 looking back toward taxiway 1. 
houlder paint str ipe 
(b) Near runway shoulder at taxiway 1 looking toward runway 32. 
Figure 7. - Suspected white t i re  scrub marks produced du r ing  turn onto runway 32 at taxiway 1. 
1 3  
Figure 8. - Tire 3 rubber marks found on surface 2,200 ft from threshold of runway 32. 
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Figure 9. - Wheel flange r i m  marks and debris f rom t i res  3 and 4 at approximately 4,188 ft from runway 32 
threshold. 
Figure 10. - Fragment of wheel 4 found 6,300 ft  f rom runway 32 threshold. 
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Figure 11. - Runway surface rubber marks from blowout of t i r e  7. 
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Wheel s c u f f  marks on the  runway sur face a t  8,000 f e e t  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  
wheels 3 and 4 were worn down t o  t he  hub (wide marks) b u t  t h a t  wheels 7 and 8 
s t i l l  r e ta ined  f langes ( two narrow marks f o r  each wheel). A t  9,000 f e e t  t he  
a i r c r a f t  was on t h e  runway center l ine ,  and a t  10,000 f e e t  i t  was 6 f e e t  r i g h t  
o f  cen te r l i ne .  
concrete sur face - was a t  11,950 fee t .  The marks were i n  l i n e  w i t h  the  t racks  
o f  the  r i g h t  main gear wheels. The scorched sur face marks pe rs i s ted  down the  
runway t o  t h e  a i r c r a f t  s top po in t  a t  12,660 f e e t  ( f i g s .  12  and 13). 
a d d i t i o n a l  wheel/brake assembly debr is  ( f i g .  14) was found on the  runway a t  
var ious  loca t ions .  The a i r c r a f t  wreckage on t h e  runway was photographed from 
a h e l i c o p t e r  ( f i g .  15) and a t  var ious ground loca t i ons  ( f i g s .  16 t o  18). 
The f i r s t  evidence o f  f i r e  on t h e  runway - scorched, d i sco lo red  
Some 
1.13 Medical and Tox ico loq ica l  In fo rmat lon  
1.13.1 Medical response. - The f l i g h t  surgeon s ta ted  t h a t  he was n o t i f i e d  
He then i n i t i a t e d  the  pyramid r e c a l l  by phone o f  t he  ground emergency a t  1830. 
o f  aeromedical services.  The medical team a r r i v e d  a t  t h e  e n t r y  c o n t r o l  p o i n t  
(ECP)  a t  1850. 
a t  base operat ions.  He s ta ted  tha t  t he re  were no signs o f  i n c a p a c i t a t i o n  o r  
i n t o x i c a t i o n  i n  any of t h e  4 crewmembers and 15 s c i e n t i s t s  and technic ians.  
A t  2020 a t  the  base hosp i ta l ,  three of t he  NASA crewmembers ( a i r c r a f t  com- 
mander, p i l o t ,  and f l i g h t  engineer) were examined and statements were taken. 
No medical problems were noted. The crew signed permission s l i p s ,  and blood 
and u r i n e  specimens were obtained f o r  l a t e r  t o x i c o l o g i c a l  analyses. 
The f l i g h t  surgeon l a t e r  assessed t h e  crew and cabin occupants 
Although the re  were no casua l t ies ,  two f i r e f i g h t e r s  i ncu r red  foam burn o f  
t h e  eyes. 
so lu t i on .  
h o s p i t a l .  There were no f u r t h e r  repo r t s  o f  i n j u r i e s .  
Good pa in  r e l i e f  was obtained by f l u s h i n g  t h e i r  eyes w i t h  a s a l i n e  
The two f i r e f i g h t e r s  were then t r a n s f e r r e d  from the  ECP t o  the  
1.13.2 Tox ico los i ca l  t es ts .  - Tox ico log ica l  t e s t s  were performed on the 
u r i n e  and blood specimens taken from the  th ree  crewmembers by Reference Lab- 
o r a t o r y  i n  Colton, C a l i f o r n i a .  These t e s t s  inc luded rad io- ,  f luorescent ,  and 
enzyme immunoassay and gas chromatography. A l l  t e s t s  were negat ive  f o r  
a lcoho l ,  carbon monoxide, opiates, cocaine, ba rb i tu ra tes ,  marl juana (THC), 
amphetamines, ant idepressants,  and phenyc l id ine  (PCP), as w e l l  as f o r  any o ther  
therapeut ic  drugs. 
1.14 F i r e  
1.14.1 Condit ions.  - A a i r c r a f t  r i gh t -w ing  f u e l  tank was penetrated by 
an ob jec t  o r  ob jec ts  f r o m  the  d i s i n t e g r a t i n g  wheels, brakes, o r  t i r e s .  Damage 
was severe enough t o  cause a "basketbal l -s ized"  column o f  f u e l  t o  pour f rom a 
r i gh t -w ing  f u e l  tank about 7 t o  9 f e e t  forward and inboard o f  t h e  r i g h t  main 
l and ing  gear. 
Witnesses s ta ted  t h a t  there was f i r e  under the  r i g h t  wing i n  the  area o f  
t h e  r i g h t  main gear be fore  the  a i r c r a f t  came t o  a stop, bu t  t h e i r  est imates o f  
where t h e  f i r e  began along the  a i r c r a f t  dece le ra t i on  path var ied.  However, no 
witnesses s ta ted  t h a t  they saw evidence o f  f i r e  before 7,000 f e e t .  
seated on t h e  r i g h t  s ide o f  t he  a i r c r a f t  cabin observed f l u i d  on the  windows 
and wetness on the  r igh t -w ing  inboard ant ishock body be fore  they observed 
flames emanating f r o m  under t h e  inboard t r a i l i n g  edge o f  t he  r i g h t  wing ( a t  
about 10.000 f t ) .  
Techniclans 
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Figure 12. - Runway surface scorch marks and t i r e  rubber debris f rom r ight  main gear at about 11,950 ft down 
runway 32. 
F igure 13. - Aerial view of fire-damaged NASA 712 at stop point, 12,660 ft down runway 32. 
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(a1 Found between 6, WO and 7,000 ft down runway 32. 
I. 
(b) Found nearly 7.205 rt down runway 32 
IcI Found between 10, COO and 11. OOO ft down runway 32 
Fiqure 14. - Some additional fraaments of r i g h t  main gear wheelibrake assembly found at various locations o n  
runway. 
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gear 
x fig. 16) 
Figure 15. - Aerial view of firedamaged NASA 712 taken at front of wreckage. 
Figure 16. - Closeup view of nose gear tires. 
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Figure 17. - Closeup view of left main gear wheels. 
Figure 18. - Closeup view of r i gh t  main gear wheels after fire. 
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The f i r e  became more in tense a f t e r  t he  a i r c r a f t  came t o  a s top and the  
f u e l  column became involved. 
engine, t o  the  r ight -wing roo t ,  and then rearward a long t h e  r i g h t  fuselage, 
engu l f i ng  the  r i g h t  side o f  t h e  a i r c r a f t  i n  flames ( f i g s .  19 and 20). 
The f i r e  r a p i d l y  spread t o  t h e  r i g h t  inboard 
1.14.2 CFR r e s  onse. - The tower c o n t r o l l e r  a c t i v a t e d  t h e  pr imary crash 
the  f i r e  department alarm room operator.4 
t r a n s m l t t i n g  the  required i n fo rma t ion  format a t  1810:28. 
a t o r  stayed on- l ine  w h i l e  quest ions were answered and secured t h e  pr imary crash 
network telephone a t  181031.  A t  1810:45 base operat ions a c t i v a t e d  t h e  second- 
a ry  crash network, which was answered by the  a larm room operator  a t  1810:55. 
A f t e r  hanging up t h e  secondary crash network telephone, he a l e r t e d  f i r e  depar t -  
ment personnel v i a  the p u b l i c  address system a t  1811:50. A number o f  f i remen 
were already moving toward t h e i r  veh ic les  10 t o  1 5  seconds be fore  h i s  announce- 
ment as a r e s u l t  of  a v i s u a l  s i g h t i n g  and n o t i f i c a t i o n  by a f i reman standing 
i n  f r o n t  o f  t h e  f i r e  s t a t i o n .  A l l  a v a i l a b l e  f i r e f i g h t e r s  and seven pieces o f  
CFR equipment, i nc lud ing  th ree  major f i r e - f i g h t i n g  veh ic les ,  responded. 
network a t  1809:49 -+- ; a l l  p a r t i e s  were on the  network a t  1809:59, i n c l u d i n g  
The tower c o n t r o l l e r  completed 
The a larm room oper- 
Chief  1 c a l l e d  " i n  serv ice"  a t  1812:15 and a r r i v e d  on the  scene a t  1813:53. 
Enroute, Chief  1 gave orders t o  r e c a l l  a l l  o f f -du ty  firemen, t o  request  mutual 
a i d  support, and t o  s e t  up resupply near the  depar ture end o f  runway 32 and t h e  
a i r c r a f t  wreckage. The f i r s t  crash veh ic le  (P-2) was app ly ing  aqueous f i l m -  
forming foam (AFFF) on the  a i r c r a f t  f i r e  a t  1814:24. The second P-2 was apply-  
i n g  AFFF a t  1814:53, and the  f i r e  t r u c k  (P-15) a r r i v e d  on the  scene a t  1815:48. 
The f i r s t  and second P-2's and t h e  P-15 were app ly ing  AFFF I n  3 minutes and 
56 seconds, 4 minutes and 25 seconds, and 5 minutes and 20 seconds, respec- 
t i v e l y ,  a f t e r  t h e  alarm room was n o t i f i e d  o f  t he  emergency through t h e  pr imary 
crash network. 
March AFB CFR equipment and response i s  d i r e c t e d  t o  p rov id ing  t ime f o r  
rescue and no t  t o  ex t ingu ish ing  massive a i r c r a f t  f i r e s .  
was no t  requi red,  f i r e f i g h t i n g  e f f o r t s  were d i rec ted  toward ex t i ngu ish ing  the 
f i r e  I n  the  r i g h t  wing and the  fuselage. 
patched t o  t h e  s i t e  o r  t o  t he  th ree  resupply po in ts ,  as appropr ia te .  Aqueous 
f i lm- fo rming  foam i n  a 3 percent  concentrate,  meeting M i l i t a r y  S p e c i f i c a t i o n  
F-243-85C, was appl ied.  
59,000 ga l lons  o f  water were expended. 
agent re tarded t h e  f i r e  when appl ied,  bu t  t h e  q u a n t i t y  was i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  pu t  
ou t  t he  f i r e .  
Table I summarizes the  t ransmissions r e l a t e d  t o  CFR a c t i v i t i e s  i n  response t o  
t he  accident.  
Since personnel rescue 
A l l  a v a i l a b l e  equipment was d i s -  
Dur ing t h e  f i r e f i g h t i n g ,  1,915 ga l l ons  o f  AFFF and 
The f i r e  abated as the  a i r c r a f t  f u e l  supply was exhausted. 
According t o  witnesses t h e  foaming 
1.14.3 Secur i ty  response. - The s e c u r i t y  f l i g h t  c h i e f  on du ty  s ta ted  
t h a t  he received n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a ground emergency v i a  t h e  pr imary crash ne t -  
work a t  1812. He proceeded t o  t h e  area and a t  1813 es tab l i shed i n i t i a l  en t r y  
c o n t r o l  p o i n t s  (ECP) a t  taxiway 1 and taxiway 5. The ECP a l lows on ly  author-  
i zed  personnel such as t h e  f i r e  department, emergency vehic les,  base commander, 
and secu r i t y  personnel i n t o  the  crash area. The s e c u r i t y  response team se t  up 
3This t ime i s  a normal ized t ime us ing  f i r e  department tapes, tower 
4The a larm room operator  on du ty  a t  t he  t ime o f  t he  acc ident  was a 
tapes 
r e l i e f  operator .  H i s  normal assignment was as a CFR veh ic le  d r i v e r .  
and a c o r r e l a t i o n  w i t h  Greenwich mean t ime. 
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TABLE I. - CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF MARCH AFB CFR/TOWER TRANSCRIPT 
Normalized 
time ( l o c a l ) ,  
min: sec 
1 806: 22 
1806:25 
1808:06 
1808:15 
1809:09 
1809 : 30 
1809:34 
1809:49 
1809:59 
1810: 03- 
1810:28 
1810:28 
1810:45 
1810:51 
1810: 55 
1811:50 
Event 
Tower c lea rs  NASA 712 
t o  hold 
NASA 712 acknowledges 
Tower issues takeoff  
c 1 earance 
NASA 712 acknowledges 
Tower t e l l  s Ontar io 
departure cont ro l  that  
NASA 712 i s  departing 
NASA 712 c a l l s  abort 
on Ontar io departure 
cont ro l  frequency 
Tower asks i f  NASA 712 
i s  experiencing 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  
Tower ac t iva tes  primary 
crash network (a1 arm 
room operator p icks  up 
phone) 
A l l  p a r t i e s  a re  on 
crash network 
Tower announces 
emergency d e t a i l s  
Tower answers questions 
Base operat ions 
ac t iva tes  secondary 
crash network 
Alarm room operator 
secures pr imary crash 
network 
Alarm room operator 
p i cks  up secondary 
crash network 
Alarm room operator 
secures secondary crasb 
network and announces 
f i r e  by pub l i c  address 
system 
Normal i zed 
ime ( l o c a l ) ,  
min: sec 
1812 : 04 
1812:15 
1812 : 39 
1812 : 44 
1812:45 
1812:54 
1812:59 
1813 : 02 
1813 : 06 
1813:23 
1813:53 
1814:24 
1814:53 
1815 :48 
Event 
"Crash Control ,  March 
tower, a i r c r a f t  i s  s i t -  
t i n g  on departure end 
and looks l i k e  he i s  on 
f i r e . "  
"Alarm, Chief  1, 
10-10-10. " 
Tower inqu i res  about 
about CFR response 
delay 
"Rescue 5 i n  service." 
(P-10) 
"OK, t hey ' re  g e t t i n g  
t h e  response message 
now. " 
Chief  1 begins r e c a l l ;  
requests mutual a id  
"10-4, Chief 1." 
"Crash 3 i n  service." 
Chief  1 t e l l s  alarm room 
room t o  have base supply 
s e t  up 
Chief  1 t e l l s  engine 7 
(P-12) t o  se t  up 
resupp ly  
Chief  1 on scene 
Crash 2 (P-2) spraying 
agent 
Crash 1 (P-2) spraying 
agent 
Crash 3 (P-15) on scene 
a 2,000-foot perimeter. 
complete, and at 1831 the on-scene commander assumed duties. 
By 1825, the evacuation of nonessential personnel was 
1.15 Survival Aspects 
1.15.1 Aircraft information. - NASA 712 was equipped with four evacuation 
slides, two overwing window exits, and two cockpit escape ropes. The evacu- 
ation slides were located at the forward and rear doors on both sides of the 
airplane. 
Company and had been inspected withln the past year. 
inflation system consisted of a spring-loaded container mounted on a door panel 
actuated by a lanyard-pulled pin as the door panel was lowered to the floor. 
These inflatable escape slides were manufactured by Air Cruisers 
The evacuation slide 
25 
The a i r c r a f t  f i r e  p r o t e c t i o n  system consis ted o f  two subsystems - f i r e  
de tec t i on  and f i re ex t ingu ish ing .  Overheat / f i re  sensors i n  the  engine areas 
ac t i va ted  cockp i t  warning b e l l s  and l i g h t s .  Dual l i g h t s  i n  each p l a s t i c  f i r e -  
p u l l  handle, one for each engine, on the  f i r e  c o n t r o l  panel i l l u m i n a t e d  t o  
i n d i c a t e  overheat o r  f i r e  - f l a s h i n g  i l l u m i n a t i o n  f o r  overheat cond i t i ons  and 
steady i l l u m i n a t i o n  f o r  f i r e  cond i t ions .  When pu l l ed ,  t h l s  handle shut o f f  
t he  f l u i d  supply t o  t he  se lected engine area and exposed normal ly  Inaccess ib le  
ex t i ngu ish ing  agent re lease switches f o r  each engine n a c e l l e  area. 
c l i pped  access door on t h e  l e f t  s ide  o f  each engine nace l l e  al lowed ground 
access f o r  f i g h t i n g  engine f i r e s  w i t h  a po r tab le  f i r e  ex t ingu isher .  Heat- 
sensing thermoswitches i n  the  main wheel w e l l s  a l s o  actuated the  b e l l  and 
i l l u m i n a t e d  corresponding l i g h t s .  
duc t i on  o f  a f i r e - e x t i n g u i s h i n g  agent i n  the  wheel w e l l  areas. 
One spr lng-  
There was no p r o v i s i o n  f o r  t he  ground i n t r o -  
1.15.2 Passenger preparedness. - A CV-990 miss ion d i r e c t o r ' s  p r e f l i g h t  
A s  b r i e f i n g  and a CV-990 sa fe ty  b r i e f i n g  are  normal ly  g iven be fore  takeo f f .  
most o f  t h e  s c i e n t i s t s  and techn ic ians  onboard had p rev ious l y  f lown on t h e  
CV-990, no general sa fe ty  b r i e f i n g s  were g iven be fore  t h l s  mission. However, 
t he  two s c i e n t i s t s  who had never f lown on NASA 712 were g iven a sa fe ty  b r i e f i n g  
about 30 t o  40 minutes be fore  the  f l i g h t .  M o s t  o f  t he  s c i e n t i s t s  and techn i -  
c ians onboard concurred t h a t  t he  sa fe ty  b r i e f i n g s  they had received were 
adequate. However, t he re  was some d i f f e r e n c e  o f  op in ion  as t o  whether the  
passengers cou ld  deploy the  evacuat ion s l i d e s  i f  necessary, and the re  was some 
confusion over whether the  s l i d e s  were armed du r ing  t a k e o f f .  
s ta ted  t h a t  t he re  was no spec i f i c  t r a i n i n g  g iven regard ing procedures a f t e r  
evacuat ing the  a i rp lane.  
I n  add i t i on ,  they 
The f o u r  crewmembers were wearing Nomex f l i g h t  s u i t s .  However, t he re  i s  
no cu r ren t  NASA requirement f o r  o ther  onboard a i r c r a f t  personnel t o  wear f i r e -  
re ta rdan t  f l i g h t  su i t s  du r ing  missions; on ly  3 o f  the  15 s c i e n t i s t s  and tech- 
n i c ians  i n  the  cabin were wearing them. Witnesses s ta ted  t h a t  prev ious 
at tempts by some o f  t he  s c i e n t i s t s  and techn ic ians  t o  ob ta in  f i r e - r e t a r d a n t  
f l i g h t  s u i t s  were no t  successful .  
1.15.3 A i r c r a f t  evacuation. - The f l i g h t c r e w  and the  cab in  occupants 
evacuated by t h e  forward and a f t  door s l i d e s  on the  l e f t  s i de  o f  t he  a i r c r a f t .  
The f o u r  crewmembers, the  miss ion manager, and e i g h t  s c i e n t i s t s  and techn ic ians  
e x i t e d  by the  forward door s l i d e ;  s i x  s c i e n t i s t s  and techn ic ians  e x i t e d  by the  
a f t  door s l i d e .  A l l  agreed t h a t  t he  evacuat ion was accomplished i n  approx i -  
mately 30 t o  45 seconds and character ized personnel conduct as calm. 
No s p e c i f i c  I nd i v idua ls  were fo rma l l y  designated t o  deploy the  var ious 
emergency evacuatlon devices, bu t  i t  was genera l l y  understood t h a t  t he  miss ion  
manager o r  h i s  ass is tan t  would normal ly  deploy t h e  f r o n t  door s l i d e s  and the  
nearest  techn ic ian  seated i n  t h e  back would deploy the  a f t  s l i des .  
comnand was g iven t o  the  s c i e n t i s t s  and techn ic ians  by t h e  f l i g h t c r e w  o r  the  
miss ion manager t o  evacuate the  a i rp lane,  and no d i r e c t i o n  was g iven as t o  
which evacuat ion devices t o  use. However, t he  l e f t  forward and l e f t  a f t  door 
s l i d e s  were deployed i n  a t i m e l y  manner by Northrop techn ic ians  who were seated 
near t h e  doors and had f lown f requen t l y  on the  CV-990. 
i nd i ca ted  t h a t  the forward door s l i d e  d i d  no t  deploy au tomat ica l l y  when the  
door was opened. The Northrop techn ic ian  s ta ted  t h a t  he manually " threw the  
s l i d e  ou t  t he  door" and then i t  I n f l a t e d .  
No s p e c i f i c  
Witness test imony 
1.16 Add i t i ona l  In fo rmat ion  
1.16.1 RTO acc ident / inc ident  in fo rmat ion .  - I n  1977 a Federal A v i a t i o n  
Admin is t ra t ion  (FAA) repor t5  cover ing 171 RTO's f rom 1964 t o  1975 concluded 
t h a t  87 percent had resu l ted  f r o m  some f a i l u r e  o r  ma l func t ion  o f  t i r e s ,  wheels, 
o r  brakes - 74 percent f rom t i r e s  alone. The data revealed t h a t  engine f a i l -  
ures have no t  been t h e  dominant causal f a c t o r  f o r  some time. The NASA A i r c r a f t  
Accident I n v e s t i g a t i o n  Board co l lec ted  data on RTO acc idents  and i n c i d e n t s  
s ince  1975, when the  FAA study ended, t o  determine i f  these t rends continued. 
Sixty-one acc ident / inc ident  records cover ing January 1976 t o  September 1985 
were i d e n t i f i e d  from Nat ional  Transpor tat ion Safety  Board, FAA, B r i t i s h  C i v i l  
A v i a t i o n  Author i ty ,  and NASA Av ia t ion  Safety  Report ing System sources. The 
dominant cause, account ing f o r  34 percent  o f  t he  documented cases, was t i r e /  
wheel f a i l u r e .  The second most dominant cause, account ing f o r  23 percent,  was 
engine f a i l u r e  o r  mal funct ion.  
remaining 43 percent o f  t h e  cases. Hence the  t rend  appears t o  be con t inu ing  
t h a t  engine f a i l u r e s  are  no t  the  pr imary cause o f  a i r c r a f t  re jec ted- takeof f  
acc idents / inc idents .  
A v a r i e t y  o f  f a c t o r s  con t r i bu ted  t o  the  
Add i t i ona l  i n fo rma t ion  from t h e  Douglas A i r c r a f t  Company on a l i m i t e d  
number o f  DC-10 t i r e - r e l a t e d  acc idents / inc idents  i nd i ca tes  t h a t  a i r c r a f t  damage 
and i n j u r y  ra tes  a re  subs tan t i a l l y  h igher  i f  a p i l o t  r e j e c t s  r a t h e r  than con- 
t i nues  t a k e o f f  when faced wi th t l r e  ma l func t ion  a t  speeds near VI. 
1.16.2 Rejected-takeoff  procedures. - The Emergency Procedures sec t i on  
o f  t he  ARC CV-990 Operat ing Manual inc ludes re jec ted- takeof f  procedures f rom 
t h e  American A i r l i n e s  CV-990 Operating Manual and the  Convair F l i g h t  Manual. 
ENGINE FAILURE, FIRE OR OVERHEAT WARNING DURING TAKEOFF 
( Ame r 1 can A i  r 1 i nes ) 
(1) DECISION TO REJECT OR CONTINUE TAKEOFF - I f  t r o u b l e  
occurs before reaching VI, abor t  t akeo f f ;  i f  speed i s  
above VI, t a k e o f f  should be continued. I f  takeo f f  i s  
aborted, r e t a r d  a l l  t h r o t t l e s ,  apply brakes, p u l l  speed 
brake handle f u l l  a f t ,  and use reverse t h r u s t  as requi red.  
I f  runway i s  s l i ppe ry ,  be a l e r t  t o  d i r e c t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  
d i f f i c u l t y  when reversing w i t h  an engine out ;  use *- 
m e t r i c a l  reverse t h r u s t  t o  t h e  ex ten t  s topping requirement 
permi ts .  
(2 )ENGINE POWER ... 
TAKEOFF ABORT 
(Convai r)  
(1 )  BEFORE V 1  - Abort performance i s  based on immediate 
t h r o t t l e  r e t a r d a t i o n  and brake a p p l i c a t i o n  fo l lowed by 
spo i l e rs  as soon as possible.  
SJet Transport  Rejected Takeoffs, F i n a l  Report, February 
1977, F l i g h t  Standards Service,  Federal Av ia t i on  Admin is t ra t ion .  
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(2) REVERSE THRUST - The use of reverse thrust is important 
especially on a wet runway. 
caution. If the abort was due to an engine failure, only 
the symmetrical engines should be reversed. Do not let 
this cholce delay brake and spoiler application. 
It must be applied with 
(3) BRAKES - Use maximum brake application to obtain full 
antiskid braking. Release and reapply only when in a posi- 
tive skid or drift. 
These procedures are general and do not address specific actions, cautions, or 
hazards (i.e., directional control, brake failure, rim failure, antiskid anom- 
alies, etc.) associated with RTO's after blown tires. 
Discussions with training personnel from the major air carriers indicate 
that procedures for RTO's have been standardized. 
cedures is that once a decision to abort has been made the following steps 
should be taken: 
The consensus of the pro- 
(1) 
(2) Maintain directional control. 
(3) Extend spoi lers. 
(4) Reverse thrust. 
(5) Put forward pressure (as required) on control column. 
(6) Maintain maximum braking until aircraft stops. 
Set throttles to idle and simultaneously depress brake pedals fully. 
The air carriers' tralnlng philosophy Is not to change the RTO procedure to 
meet different emergency situations. The rationale is that having one proce- 
dure for all situations makes it easier to train flightcrews and may signi- 
ficantly reduce flightcrew reaction time to an emergency. 
1.16.3 Pilot training for rejected takeoffs. - The determination of the 
minimum runway length required for takeoff, or conversely, the determination 
of the maximum welght that an airplane could take off any given runway is based 
on what is called a balanced-field concept (fig. 21). This concept is pred- 
icated on the calculated ability of the aircraft either to stop within the 
runway length or to successfully continue to take off after an engine failure 
during the takeoff roll. The speed at which the decision must be made either 
to continue or to reject takeoff is referred to as This speed is the 
most critical factor affecting the pilot's decision to reject or continue a 
takeoff. If an engine failure occurs before reaching V1 on takeoff, the 
capability exists to stop the aircraft on a smooth, dry, hard-surface runway 
by using wheel brakes alone without reverse thrust. Decision speed Vi is 
predicated on having normal brakes, wheels, and tires. If an engine failure 
occurs at or above VI, the takeoff may be continued and the pilot, using 
proper procedures and techniques, is assured of achieving a 35-foot height 
over the runway end. 
Vi. 
Appendix E (Flight Training Requirements) of 14 CFR 121 requires that air 
carrier flightcrews receive appropriate initial, transition, and upgraded 
training. This training must Include takeoff training with a simulated failure 
of the most critlcal engine, which may be accomplished in a visual simulator. 
In general, RTO training has been predicated on an engine failure before reach- 
ing the calculated VI 
conditions, and field elevation. However, there is no requirement to famillar- 
ize pilots with the effect of blown tires on braking or with directional con- 
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speed for the aircraft gross weight, atmospheric 
"1 
I /////, 
L All-engine acceleration L Stopcdistance _I 
(a) All-engine-acceleration stop. 
._ .. 
I 
All-engine acceleration Engine-out acceleration 
Eng ine-fa i I u re takeoff distance 
(b) Engine-failure takeoff. 
Figure 21. - Balanced-field-length takeoff. 
t r o l  and a n t i s k i d  anomalies o r  t o  i d e n t i f y  hazards associated w i t h  heavy a i r -  
c r a f t  r o l l i n g  a t  h igh  speeds on blown t i r e s  and f r a n g i b l e  r i m s .  
A f t e r  surveying a i r  c a r r i e r  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  s imu la to r  f a c i l i t i e s ,  the  
Board found t h a t  76 s imulators  i n  opera t ion  a t  16 a i r  c a r r i e r s  as o f  October 
1985 met FAA Phase I1 or  Phase 111 requirements. These Phase II/III s imulators  
can present f a i l e d - t i r e  models with vary ing  degrees o f  rea l ism.  Several a i r  
c a r r i e r s ,  however, repor ted  t h a t  p i l o t s  a re  exposed t o  s imulated f a i l e d - t i r e  
a i r c r a f t  operat ions on ly  du r ing  t r a n s i t i o n  t r a i n i n g  f rom one type o f  a i r c r a f t  
t o  another and no t  du r ing  regular currency t r a i n i n g .  
1.16.4 Nose wheel s teer ing.  - The CV-990 Operat ing Manual, under normal 
opera t ing  procedures f o r  takeof f ,  s ta tes  t h a t  "...TO ob ta in  maximum a i r p l a n e  
acce le ra t i on  (and d i r e c t i o n a l  cont ro l . . . ) ,  ho ld  nose wheel on runway as long 
as poss ib le .  Nose wheel s teer ing should normal ly  be used f o r  d i r e c t i o n a l  con- 
t r o l  u n t i l  a i rspeed has increased t o  80 knots. The rudder becomes e f f e c t i v e  
... and should normal ly  be used f o r  d i r e c t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  a t  h igher  airspeeds."  
Landing procedures inc lude the  fo l low ing :  "...On touchdown re lease back- 
pressure on the  c o n t r o l  column as soon as the  main wheels touch t h e  runway, 
g radua l ly  lower ing the  nose wheel t o  the  runway. As soon as the  nose wheel 
touches, ho ld  forward pressure on yoke . . . I '  
t r anspor t  a i r c r a f t  Ind ica tes  s i m i l a r  procedures. 
A survey o f  c h e c k l i s t s  f o r  o ther  
1.16.5 A n t i s k i d  brake sys tem operat ion.  - The CV-990 a n t i s k i d  brake 
system i s  a f u l l y  automatic, pressure-modulating, wheel-braking system, con- 
t r o l l e d  by I n d i v i d u a l  wheel speed transducers,  an a n t i s k i d  c o n t r o l  box, and 
i n d i v i d u a l  a n t i s k i d  c o n t r o l  valves f o r  each main wheel brake. The a n t i s k i d  
f u n c t i o n  does no t  operate u n t i l  the  a i r c r a f t  wheels r o t a t e  o r ,  on landing, 
u n t i l  one o f  the  t w o  ground safety  re lays  i nd i ca tes  ground mode o r  t he  pro- 
t ec ted  wheel spins up. The a n t l s k i d  l o g i c  system uses the f a s t e s t  o f  the  e i g h t  
main wheels as the  pr imary reference. Any wheel o r  wheels t h a t  dev ia te  a pre- 
se t  percentage f r o m  t h i s  reference wheel speed are  sensed as being I n  a sk id .  
A re lease s igna l  i s  t ransmi t ted  t o  t h a t  wheel 's a n t i s k i d  c o n t r o l  valve.  Brake 
pressure i s  reapp l ied  au tomat ica l l y  when t h a t  wheel a t t a i n s  a speed value 
w i t h i n  a s p e c i f i e d  percentage of  t h e  reference wheel 's speed. 
brake system t o  modulate pressure proper ly ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  wheel speeds (and 
For the  a n t i s k i d  
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t h e  a i r p l a n e ' s  ground speed) must  be above the  low-speed dropout value o f  10 
knots and w i t h i n  30-percent agreement i n  i n d i v i d u a l  wheel speeds. 
wheel speeds exceed a 30-percent d i f f e r e n t i a l ,  a locked-wheel (brake re lease)  
s i t u a t i o n  would occur ra the r  than the  normal brake-pressure-modulated a n t i s k l d  
response. I n  t h i s  acc ident  t h e  near l y  simultaneous f a i l u r e  o f  t i r e s  3 and 4 
resu l ted  i n  greater than 30-percent speed d i f f e r e n c e  between wheels 3 and 4 
(blown t i r e s ,  smaller diameters, h igher  speeds) and the  o ther  s i x  main gear 
t l r e s .  
i n  no braking. Hydro-Alre engineers s ta ted  t h a t  under these nonuniform wheel 
speed cond i t ions  maximum d e f l e c t i o n  o f  both pedals would r e s u l t  i n  one o f  t he  
f o l l o w l n g  scenarios: 
I f  these 
As a consequence, d e f l e c t i o n  o f  on ly  t h e  l e f t  brake pedal would r e s u l t  
(1)  Brake pressure would be app l ied  on ly  t o  t h e  f a s t  wheels (nos. 3 and 
4 ) ,  promptly (1  t o  2 sec) reducing the  speed d i f f e r e n t i a l .  Once the  wheel 
speeds were w i t h i n  30 percent  o f  each other ,  t h e  system would r e t u r n  t o  normal, 
f u l l y  modulated, indlvidual-wheel-control a n t i s k i d  brak ing.  
( 2 )  The wheel o r  wheels w i thou t  t i r e s  would f u l l y  l ock  and remain locked, 
f l a t  spo t t i ng  the r i m  o r  r i m s .  
(3 )  The wheel o r  wheels w i thout  t i r e s  would sp in  down, generate a locked- 
wheel release, spin back up t o  f reewheel ing speed, and then repeat t h i s  cyc le .  
I n  t h i s  scenar lo the s i x  normal main wheel brakes would remain f u l l y  re leased. 
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2.0 ANALYSIS 
2.1 General 
The f l i g h t c r e w  was proper ly  c e r t i f i e d ,  and each crewmember had received 
t h e  t r a i n i n g  and r e s t  prescr ibed by app l i cab le  ARC p o l i c i e s .  
evidence o f  medical problems tha t  might  have a f f e c t e d  t h e i r  performance. 
There was no 
The a i r c r a f t  was c e r t i f i e d  a i rwor thy  i n  accordance w i t h  ARC a i rwor th iness  
procedures. It was maintained I n  accordance w i t h  Convair recommended mainte- 
nance procedures. The a i r c r a f t  gross weight and center  o f  g r a v i t y  were w i t h i n  
p rescr ibed l i m i t s .  The a i r c r a f t ' s  a i r f rame,  systems, and powerplants were no t  
causal  t o  t h i s  acc ident .  
2.2 Accident Sequence 
NASA 712 tax ied  the 2.4-mile t a x i  rou te  i n  about 5 minutes (average speed 
o f  28.8 mph, o r  25 knots) .  A i r c r a f t  t i r e  r o l l  t e s t s  have ind i ca ted  t h a t  t h e  
t a x i  out  f o r  t a k e o f f  w i t h  a heav i l y  loaded a i r c r a f t  can g r e a t l y  s t ress  the  
t i r e s  and produce s i g n i f i c a n t  heat bu i ldup.  Taxi techniques can in f l uence  the  
amount o f  heat b u i l t  up by s idewal l  f l e x i n g .  Because o f  the  l o w  heat conduct- 
i v i t y  o f  rubber, t i r e  temperatures cont inue t o  r i s e  wi th  d is tance t rave led .  
As t h i s  temperature r i s e  i s  a l so  in f luenced by t a x i  speed, p i l o t s  should n o t  
inc rease the  t a x i  speed when the t a x i  d is tance i s  long. Because h igher  t i r e  
temperatures decrease t i r e  strength,  the FAA and a i r f rame manufacturers recom- 
mend a maximum t a x i  speed o f  not  more than 30 knots.  Lower t a x i  speeds should 
be used a t  h igh  gross weights or f o r  long t a x i  d is tances.  The Board concluded 
t h a t  excessive t a x i  speed was not a c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r  i n  t h i s  acc ident  s ince 
t h e  average t a x i  speed o f  NASA 712 was about 25 knots.  
The f l i g h t c r e w  and t h e  s c i e n t i s t s  and techn ic ians  onboard t h e  a i r c r a f t  
s ta ted  t h a t  the  t a x i  out  was normal, w i t h  t h e  except ion o f  a "thump" heard 
when the  a i r c r a f t  was on the taxiway. A f t e r  d iscuss ing  the  thump, the  occu- 
pants concluded t h a t  i t  was probably caused by the  a i r - c o n d i t i o n i n g  duc t ing ,  
s ince  the  same sound had been heard on previous f l i g h t s .  The Board examined 
t h e  t a x i  rou te  sur face and found no th ing  t h a t  could account f o r  t h e  thump. 
NASA 712 l e f t  a d i s t i n c t i v e  wh i te  t r a c k  as I t  took the  runway. The a i r -  
c r a f t  t i r e s  scrubbed b lack j e t  engine exhaust deposi ts  o f f  t he  PCC runway sur- 
face  du r ing  the  t u r n  onto the  runway. The w id th  o f  t he  i n d i v i d u a l  t i r e  t read  
was uniform, showing no evidence o f  l o s t  i n f l a t i o n  pressure o r  o ther  t i r e  
abnormal i ty .  L i g h t  o r  even moderate brake drag probably would no t  be detected 
on the  runway o r  taxiway surface, b u t  subsequent heat e f f e c t s  would have oc- 
cur red  i n  the  t i r e  body. The t i r e  3 re t read  cap, most o f  which was recovered, 
showed no heat e f f e c t s .  
land ing  gear, w i t h  p a r t i c u l a r  emphasis on bear ings 3 and 4, revealed no abnor- 
m a l i t i e s .  An inspec t ion  o f  t h e  brakes, a l though no t  conc lus ive because o f  f i r e  
damage, showed no evidence o f  dragging. Therefore t h e  Board concludes t h a t  the 
main gear t i r e s  were proper ly  i n f l a t e d  and t h a t  t he  brake systems were normal 
when the  a i r c r a f t  t ax ied  onto t h e  runway. 
Inspect ion o f  t he  wheel bear ings on the  r i g h t  main 
The CV-990 a i r c r a f t  has dual nose wheels and e i g h t  main gear t i r e s  mounted 
on two four-wheel t rucks .  Each main gear t r u c k  has t w o  ax les,  one f o r e  and one 
a f t  o f  the  land ing  gear s t r u t .  The design a l lows v e r t i c a l  b u t  n o t  l a t e r a l  
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pivoting of the truck. 
tha t  load being shifted t o  the remaining t i r e  on the same axle. 
Consequently a f a i l u r e  of one of the t i r e s  resu l t s  i n  
The evidence showed tha t  the accident began w i t h  tread/carcass separation 
on t i r e  3, precipitating the overload f a i l u r e  of t i r e  4 since both t i r e s  were 
on the same axle. The analysis of t i r e  and wheel marks on the runway indicated 
tha t  the f a i lu re  sequence began when the tread from the t i r e  3 s tar ted coming 
apar t  a t  about 1,400 f ee t .  The f a i l i ng  t i r e  3 caused t i r e  4 t o  run i n  an over- 
loaded condition. T h i s  continued u n t i l  the 4,125-foot mark when t i r e  4 blew, 
followed 0.05 second l a t e r  by the blowout of the t i r e  3 carcass a t  4,138 f ee t .  
The postaccident examination of the t i r e  fragments indicated tha t  extreme heat 
had b u i l t  up i n  t i r e  4 ,  contributing t o  i t s  f a i lu re .  
W i t h  the fa i lure  of t i r e s  3 and 4 on the r ight  truck, nos. 3 and 4 fran- 
gible  aluminum wheels contacted the runway. The r i g h t  s ide of the a i r c r a f t  was 
now supported by t i r e s  7 and 8 and wheel rims 3 and 4. 
riding intermittently on wheel rims 3 and 4 from the 4,175-foot point. Most of 
the remaining rubber of t i r e s  3 and 4 (except for  the bead bundles) was abraded 
very quickly. The black scuffing on the runway from these t i r e  remnants and 
bead bundles, and the subsequent f a i l u r e  of t i r e s  7 and 8 probably caused an 
almost continuous t r a i l  of white smoke t o  be emitted from the underside of the 
a i r c r a f t .  
The a i r c r a f t  began 
The drag result ing from the t i r e  f a i lu re s  caused the a i r c r a f t  t o  swerve 
s l igh t ly  t o  the r i g h t .  
w i t h i n  300 f ee t  ( less  than 2 sec) of the f i r s t  two t i r e  blowouts. There were 
no v i s ib le  indications of l e f t  main gear wheel braking t o  correct for  t h i s  
swerve and, i n  f ac t ,  the p i l o t  stated tha t  he was "going t o  stay off the 
brakes." The actions taken by the p i l o t ,  a f t e r  the f i r s t  t i r e  blowouts, were 
t o  close the thro t t les  ( the  C V R  indicated tha t  the t h r o t t l e s  were closed w i t h i n  
4 seconds of these blowouts), t o  deploy the spoi lers ,  and t o  correct for  a 
s l i gh t  r ight  swerve. 
Marks on the runway indicated tha t  the swerve began 
Runway scuff marks show tha t  t i r e  8 fai led a t  6,190 f ee t .  From C V R  
information t h i s  occurred 9 seconds a f t e r  t i r e  4 blew o u t .  The flightcrew 
perceived t h i s  as  the second t i r e  f a i lu re .  Tire 7 blew o u t  a t  7,300 f e e t  and 
the sound was recorded on the C V R .  However, the flightcrew stated tha t  they 
d i d  n o t  hear the blowout as i t  was masked by the sounds of engine spoolup as 
reverse thrus t  was belng applied 1 2  seconds a f t e r  the @labortli cal lout .  There 
was no runway evidence of wheel braking from e i ther  the f u l l y  operational l e f t  
main gear or the f a i l i n g  r ight  main gear. 
After the blowouts of t i r e s  3 and 4,  rim markings were evident on the run- 
way fo r  approximately 1,500 f e e t ,  a t  which p o i n t  the rims s tar ted breaking up 
and fragments were thrown i n  a l l  d i rect ions.  These fragments may have contrib- 
uted t o  the f a i l u r e  of the two rear t i r e s .  
suspected tha t  the wing was punctured a f t e r  f a i l u r e  of the nos. 3 and 4 rims 
and wheels, somewhere between 6,000 and 7,000 f e e t  from the takeoff end of the 
runway. Outside witnesses described intermittent f lashes of f i r e  around the 
r ight  main gear a f t e r  7,000 f ee t .  Inside witnesses saw flames coming from 
under the right-wing f laps  a t  10,000 f ee t  and passed t h i s  information t o  the 
flightcrew. The a i r c ra f t  was immediately brought t o  a stop and evacuated. 
Shortly thereaf te r  the a i r c r a f t  was engulfed i n  flames. 
From witness testimony i t  i s  
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2.3 T i r e  F a i l u r e  Analys is  
The sequence o f  t i r e  f a i l u r e s  was es tab l i shed by t h e  marks on t h e  runway 
T i r e  3 was the  f i r s t  t i r e  and analyses o f  t he  t i re /whee l  assembly fragments. 
t o  begin fragmenting. Por t ions o f  t he  t read  recovered from the  runway s t i l l  
had cas ing attached, i n d i c a t i n g  tha t  f a i l u r e  probably o r i g ina ted  i n  the  casing 
s t ruc tu re .  Once po r t i ons  o f  t he  t read were l o s t ,  t he  diameter o f  t h e  t i r e  was 
reduced, causing t i r e  4 t o  run  i n  an overloaded cond i t ion .  This resu l ted  i n  
excessive s idewal l  f l e x i n g  and s i g n i f i c a n t  heat bu i ldup.  The heat ing  reduced 
cord s t reng th  and ra ised i n t e r n a l  t i r e  pressure. When the  t e n s i l e  l i m i t s  o f  
t h e  cord were exceeded, a catast rophic  blowout occurred. Postaccident examin- 
a t i o n  o f  t i r e  4 fragments revealed evidence o f  extreme heat bu i ldup as w e l l  as 
the  c l a s s i c  " X "  rup ture  usua l l y  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  blowout f a i l u r e .  T i res  7 and 8 
probably f a i l e d  f r o m  over load caused by the f a i l u r e  o f  t i r e s  3 and 4. T l r e s  7 
and 8 may a l so  have been punctured by wheel fragments from the  t w o  forward 
wheel assemblies. 
T i r e s  3, 4, and 7 were 12 years o ld .  Although rubber and ny lon  age q u i t e  
s lowly  under favorab le  cond i t ions ,  embr i t t lement  may be g r e a t l y  accelerated by 
h igh  temperatures and exposure t o  the elements. 
p r o p e r t i e s  o f  the  ma te r ia l s  due t o  aging may man i fes t  i t s e l f  under c r i t i c a l  
opera t ing  cond i t ions .  The Board concludes the re fo re  t h a t  t he  age o f  t he  t i r e s  
may have had a con t r i bu to ry  r o l e  i n  t h i s  acc ident .  
The degradat ion i n  phys ica l  
2.4 W i  ns Penetrat  i on 
The exact moment, ob jec t ,  and l o c a t i o n  o f  pene t ra t i on  o f  t he  r i gh t -w ing  
f u e l  tank could no t  be determined. Occupants seated a f t  i n  the  cabin observed 
f l u i d  on the  r i g h t  windows and t h e  r i g h t  inboard ant ishock body before n o t i c i n g  
i n t e r m i t t e n t  flames coming from under the  t r a i l i n g  edge o f  the  r i g h t  inboard 
f l a p  a t  about 10,000 fee t .  
probably mixed w i t h  the  wh i te  smoke f rom abrading res idua l  t i r e  rubber and f rom 
the  wheel r i m s  scor ing  the  PCC surface. The m i s t  would no t  be d i s c e r n i b l e  t o  
the  ou ts ide  witnesses. A number of witnesses, i n c l u d i n g  CV-990 a i r c r a f t  
maintenance personnel, f i r s t  observed f i r e  between 7,000 and 8,000 fee t .  Th is  
i s  co inc iden ta l  t o  the  f i r s t  sounds o f  reverse t h r u s t  spoolup as recorded on 
the  CVR,  which occurred a t  about 7,150 fee t ,  1.5 seconds before t i r e  7 blew 
out  a t  7,300 fee t .  A i r c r a f t  forward v e l o c i t y  probably prevented i g n i t i o n  of 
t he  f u e l  m i s t  u n t i l  reverse t h r u s t  a p p l i c a t i o n  d i s rup ted  the  a i r f l o w  around the  
wing and fuselage. The Board concludes t h a t  the escaping f u e l  m i s t  i g n i t e d  
w i t h  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  reverse t h r u s t  and t h a t  a r i gh t -w ing  f u e l  tank had been 
penetrated before t h i s  p o i n t  (7,000 f e e t ) .  
The fue l  m i s t  c reated by the  tank rup tu re  was 
The ob jec t  t h a t  penetrated the wing could n o t  be p o s i t i v e l y  I d e n t i f i e d .  
F i r e  completely destroyed the  r i g h t  wing, l eav ing  no clues. A c a r e f u l  inspec- 
t i o n  o f  t he  melted remains f a i l e d  t o  revea l  any i n fo rma t ion  concerning the  
puncture mechanism. The C V R  was e l e c t r o n i c a l l y  expanded and s c r u t i n i z e d  f o r  
unusual s ignatures t h a t  might i nd i ca te  the  t i m e  o f  wing impact, bu t  none were 
i d e n t i f i e d .  Evidence suggests t w o  p o s s i b i l i t i e s :  t h a t  t h e  wing was penetrated 
by a l a r g e  p iece (23 l b )  o f  t i r e  4 a t  t he  i n s t a n t  o f  blowout, o r  t h a t  the wing 
was ruptured by metal fragments f r o m  the  d i s i n t e g r a t i n g  wheel and brake assem- 
b l i e s .  Witnesses s ta ted  t h a t  t he  l oca t i on  o f  t he  pene t ra t i on  was forward and 
inboard o f  t he  r i g h t  main gear near a 12- inch by 22-inch wing-fuel- tank inspec- 
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tion panel. 
wing penetration by the tire piece (appendir D ) .  
Convair and NASA analyses tend to discount the posslbllity of 
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2.5 Re3 ected-Takeof f Dec 1 s i on-Haki ng 
The most critical element of the accident was the pilot's response to the 
first tire failures, which occurred just before the aircraft reached 
At the failure moment the pilot had two options: 
to reject it. The option to continue the takeoff was a viable possibility. 
In fact, statistics have shown that aircraft that experience blown tires on 
takeoff, continue the takeoff, and land after decreasing the aircraft gross 
weight have Incurred much less damage than those involved in RTO's. 
more there have been no injuries Involved in those instances where takeoff was 
continued, but there have been fatallties and severe injuries in RTO accidents. 
In this accident, if the aircraft had taken off successfully, it would have 
averted a high-speed, heavyweight RTO. However, continuing the takeoff would 
have involved other factors and pilot decisions in order to maneuver and con- 
figure the aircraft to successfully terminate the flight. 
conclusively that contlnuing the takeoff would have been a better option, only 
that statistics indicate that the potential for a successful outcome could 
have been greater. 
VI. 
to continue the takeoff, or 
Further- 
The Board cannot say 
Pilot testimony and CVR evidence show that the decisions of the aircraft 
commander and the pilot to reject the takeoff were immediate and simultaneous. 
The Board believes the decisions were based on their training and experience. 
Each pilot had over 7,000 flying hours. Written procedures and pilot training 
have traditionally emphasized and required that an RTO be initiated for an 
engine failure occurring before V1 with the balanced-field stopping dis- 
tance predicated on operable tires, wheels, and brakes. The basic RTO guide- 
line has been to reject the takeoff if any problem is recognized before V i  
or to continue the takeoff If it is recognized at or after VI. Since Vi 
speed Is the go/no-go decision speed in the event of an engine failure, the 
Board believes that pilots have come to regard 
speed for any recognized anomaly during the takeoff roll regardless of specific 
factors. These factors may include conditions similar to those of this 
accldent such as all engines operative and runway length in excess of that 
required for a balanced field. Statistics Indicate that RTO's in response to 
tire problems are four times more likely to result in an accident or incident 
than those In response to englne problems. 
decision-making for rejected takeoffs. 
V1 as the go/no-go declslon 
Therefore the Board examined pilot 
In general, the pilot decision-making process requires two kinds of 
Information, current and background, and this information must be integrated 
and acted on in seconds. Pilots should be aware that the need for an RTO can 
occur on every takeoff and should anticipate the problems that may trigger one. 
The RTO is one of the most demanding maneuvers for a flightcrew to perform, 
especially if conducted in a heavy aircraft at or near 
this accident. 
make instant decisions at the limits of his/her knowledge and training. Since 
it is impossible to predict, for instance, a possible tire failure on a heavy, 
high-speed takeoff, knowledge about various types of sltuatlons, when properly 
applied, can alleviate the need to rely entirely on sklll. 
situation the more background information a pilot has, the faster and more 
accurate the decision-making process can be. 
V i ,  as occurred in 
These situations may require a pilot to exercise skill and to 
Obviously in any 
Tra in ing  o f  p i l o t s  t o  respond w i t h  one procedure, cued s o l e l y  by VI 
speed, f o r  a l l  RTO s i t u a t i o n s  has been based on several  p r i n c i p l e s .  F i r s t ,  i t  
may be pre ferab le  t o  keep an a i r c r a f t  w i t h  a problem on t h e  ground r a t h e r  than 
t o  take  i t  i n t o  the  a i r .  Second, the re  i s  the  i nna te  d i f f i c u l t y  of eva lua t i ng  
anomalies and dec id ing  on a l t e r n a t i v e  ac t ions  w h i l e  acce le ra t i ng  a t  h igh  speed. 
Thi rd ,  i t  i s  a well-documented t r a i n i n g  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  t r a i n i n g  f o r  a s i n g l e  
response t o  any emergency strengthens t h e  automatic, uni form, expedi t ious 
response of t he  e n t i r e  f l i g h t c r e w  i n  a u n i f i e d  ac t i on .  The Board understands 
t h i s  reasoning bu t  be l ieves  t h a t ,  g iven  the  s t a t i s t i c s  and the  f i n d i n g  t h a t  
more RTO's a re  caused by t i r e  f a i l u r e s  than engine f a i l u r e s ,  RTO procedures 
should be reviewed. Perhaps t h e  dec is ion  t o  r e j e c t  t a k e o f f  should be based on 
an inc reas ing  l e v e l  o f  c r i t i c a l i t y  as the  a i r c r a f t  approaches 
s i d e r a t i o n  could be t h a t  when takeo f f  speeds a r e  between 20 knots below VI 
and VI, on ly  an engine f a i l u r e  could cause the  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  an RTO. T i r e  
f a i l u r e s  and o ther  l ess  ser ious anomalies would no t  au tomat i ca l l y  prompt an 
RTO. This would address a s i t u a t i o n  where t i r e  problems mani fest  themselves 
j u s t  before o r  a t  VI, compromising t h e  a i r c r a f t ' s  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  stop w i t h i n  
the  remaining a v a i l a b l e  runway. I f  t h e  takeo f f  would be continued, the  damaged 
t i r e  system would n e i t h e r  be subjected t o  the  f u l l  weight (w i thou t  some aero- 
dynamic l i f t i n g )  of an a i r c r a f t  loaded f o r  t a k e o f f  nor  t o  t h e  s t ress  o f  a h igh-  
speed, maximum-braking-effort RTO. I t  may be t h a t  t he  on ly  high-speed t i r e  
f a i l u r e  t h a t  would requ i re  an RTO would be one t h a t  had caused major engine 
degradat ion.  The Board f e e l s  tha t  f u r t h e r  study i s  requ i red  i n  t h i s  area t o  
p rov ide  p i l o t s  w i t h  more background in fo rma t ion  t o  enhance t h e i r  knowledge and 
decision-making c a p a b i l i t y  and tha t  such in fo rma t ion  could have enhanced the  
p i l o t ' s  dec is ions i n  t h i s  accident. 
VI. One con- 
M o s t  RTO t r a i n i n g  f o r  a i r  c a r r i e r  f l i g h t c r e w s  occurs i n  f l i g h t  s imulators ,  
and t h i s  t r a i n i n g  I s  l i m i t e d  by t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  t he  s imu la to r  and by t r a i n i n g  
requirements. Since s t a t i s t i c s  i nd i ca te  t h a t  most RTO's r e s u l t  f rom t i r e  f a i l -  
ure, t he  Board be l ieves  t h a t  there i s  a need t o  r e a l i s t i c a l l y  program a simula- 
t o r  model w i t h  these cha rac te r i s t i cs .  This should i nc lude  the  e f f e c t s  o f  
b rak ing  w i th  a blown t i r e  o r  t i r e s ;  b rak ing  w i t h  p a r t  o f  t h e  t r u c k  r o l l i n g  on 
rims; t he  i n t e r a c t i o n s  o f  blown t i r e s  and a n t i s k i d  brak ing;  d i r e c t i o n a l  con- 
t r o l  problems; t h e  brak ing  e f f o r t  requ i red  f o r  maximum ef fec t i veness ;  and t h e  
hazards associated w i t h  high-speed RTO's on f r a n g i b l e  r i m s .  
Once the  p i l o t  made the  dec is ion t o  r e j e c t  the  takeo f f ,  he had two opt ions 
remaining: maximum dece lera t ion  t o  s top the  a i r c r a f t  as soon as poss ib le ,  o r  
l ess  than maximurn dece le ra t ion .  The p i l o t  d i d  reac t  prompt ly t o  the  t i r e  f a i l -  
ures and i n  accordance w i t h  ARC takeoff  RTO procedures, w i t h  the  poss ib le  
except ion o f  brak ing.  The p i l o t  stated t h a t  he intended t o  use l i g h t  b rak ing  
because o f  t he  runway 1er:gth (which was 2,800 f t  more runway than the  minimum 
requ i red  by the  ba lanced- f ie ld  concept), d i r e c t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  problems, and h i s  
concern w i t h  f a i l u r e  o f  add i t i ona l  t i r e s .  These f a c t o r s  l e d  t o  t h e  p i l o t ' s  
dec i s ion  no t  t o  immediately stop the a i r c r a f t .  The Board be l ieves  t h a t  t h e  
p i l o t ' s  dec i s ion  t o  a l l o w  the  a i r c r a f t  t o  r o l l  ou t  was based on h i s  exper ience 
and on h i s  percept ion  and assessment o f  the  s i t u a t i o n .  The Board does f e e l ,  
however, t h a t  once an abor t  dec is ion has been made, maximum brak ing  should be 
app l i ed  immediately f o r  the  most e f f i c i e n t  dece le ra t ion .  Maximum brak ing  
should be he ld  u n t i l  the  a i r c r a f t  stops wh i l e  a l s o  ma in ta in ing  d i r e c t i o n a l  
c o n t r o l .  The reasons f o r  t h i s  recommended procedure i nc lude  the  f o l l o w i n g :  
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(1 )  Poss ib le  puncture o f  wing f u e l  tanks I s  minimized. 
(2 )  Wheel braking i s  most e f f e c t i v e  w h i l e  t i r e s  a re  on the  wheel r ims. 
( 3 )  The r i s k  of a d d i t i o n a l  f a i l u r e ,  i n c l u d i n g  b r a k e l i n e  rup ture ,  fuse lage 
( 4 )  Onboard personnel can evacuate sooner. 
( 5 )  
puncture, o r  r i m  f a i l u r e ,  i s  minimized. 
A i r c r a f t  a re  b u i l t  and c e r t i f i e d  t o  endure brake f i r e s .  
I n  t h i s  accident,  i f  t h e  p i l o t  had e lec ted  t o  use maximum wheel b rak ing  t o  s top 
the  a i r c r a f t  as soon as poss ib le ,  he might have r e a l i z e d  s i g n i f i c a n t  a n t l s k i d  
b rak ing  c a p a b i l i t y  on the  d ry  runway surface, and d i r e c t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  problems 
would have been mlnlmlzed. 
do no t  a l l o w  a more d e f i n i t i v e  statement. 
The unique f a i l u r e  modes of t h i s  a n t i s k i d  system 
The Board concludes t h a t  a f r e s h  look should be g iven t o  RTO procedures 
and t r a i n i n g .  I n  add l t ion ,  a l l  p i l o t s  should be made aware o f  acc ident /  
i n c i d e n t  s t a t i s t i c s  i n v o l v i n g  RTO dec is ions versus complet ing the  t a k e o f f  and 
o f  t he  necess i ty  t o  use maximum dece le ra t i on  i n  response t o  an RTO dec is ion.  
2.6 Nose Wheel S teer ing  
The a i r c r a f t  veered t o  the  r i g h t  immediately f o l l o w i n g  t h e  t i r e  f a i l u r e s .  
The p l l o t  s ta ted  tha t  du r ing  t h e  r o l l o u t  he had been concerned w i t h  keeping 
the  a i r c r a f t  on t h e  runway, us ing the  nose wheel s t e e r i n g  t o  c o n t r o l  t he  a i r -  
c r a f t  t rack .  He had f e l t  t h a t  t he  nose wheel s t e e r i n g  was having l i t t l e  e f f e c t  
and thought the  nose wheel t i r e s  may have a l s o  blown out.  An examination o f  
t he  nose wheel t i r e s  i nd i ca ted  they had experienced low corner ing  forces w i t h  
a wear p a t t e r n  showing sideways scu f f i ng ,  an i n d i c a t i o n  o f  nose wheel s t e e r i n g  
i ne f fec t i veness .  The Board i s  concerned t h a t  a l l  p i l o t s  should be aware t h a t  
t he  rudder i s  most e f f e c t i v e  f o r  d i r e c t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  a t  h igh  speeds and t h a t  
nose wheel s t e e r i n g  I s  m o s t  e f f e c t i v e  a t  low speeds. 
Onboard witnesses s ta ted  t h a t  t he  p i l o t  appeared t o  have d i f f i c u l t y  main- 
t a i n i n g  d i r e c t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  by us ing  nose wheel s tee r ing  du r ing  the  e a r l y  phase 
o f  t he  RTO. I n  add l t ion ,  the  a i r c r a f t  commander s ta ted  t h a t  he was no t  ho ld ing  
t h e  c o n t r o l  yoke forward du r ing  the  r o l l o u t .  Although RTO procedures i n  the  
C V - 9 9 0  manuals used by ARC p i l o t s  do n o t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  s t a t e  t h a t  t he  yoke be 
he ld  forward du r ing  a RTO, they do spec i f y  t h a t  i t  be he ld  forward du r ing  take- 
o f f  and immediately a f t e r  t he  nose wheel i s  on t h e  runway a f t e r  land ing  t o  
enhance d i r e c t i o n a l  c o n t r o l .  
should apply f o r  RTO's, and the  Board be l ieves  t h a t  RTO procedures should 
i nc lude  ho ld ing  forward pressure on t h e  yoke du r ing  r o l l o u t ,  cons i s ten t  w i t h  
the  p a r a l l e l  requirements f o r  d i r e c t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  versus maximum brak ing  
e f  f e c t l  veness . 
Therefore i t  fo l l ows  t h a t  t he  same procedures 
2.7 Operat ion of Ant isk ld  Brake System 
The C V - 9 9 0  a n t l s k i d  brake system has pressure c o n t r o l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  
p i l o t s  should be aware o f  when opera t ing  i n  a f a i l e d - t i r e  mode. Hydro-Aire 
engineers s ta ted  tha t  when nonuniform wheel speed cond i t ions  e x i s t  (such as 
f a i l u r e  o f  t i r e s  3 and 4),  maximum brake pedal d e f l e c t i o n  would r e s u l t  i n  one 
o f  t h ree  scenar ios:  
( 1 )  Brake pressure i s  app l ied  on ly  t o  the  f a s t  wheels (nos. 3 and 4) 
prompt ly ( 1  t o  2 sec) reducing the  speed d i f f e r e n t i a l .  Once the  speed d i f f e r -  
36 
e n t i a 1  w i t h  the  other  main wheels i s  w i t h i n  30 percent,  t he  system re tu rns  t o  
normal, f u l l y  modulated, ind iv idual -wheel -contro l  a n t i s k i d  brak ing.  
(2 )  The wheel o r  wheels wi thout  t i r e s  f u l l y  l ock  and remain locked, f l a t  
s p o t t i n g  the  r l m  o r  r i m s .  
( 3 )  The wheel o r  wheels wi thout  t i r e s  sp in  down, generate a locked-wheel 
release, sp in  back up t o  f reewheel ing speed, and then repeat t h i s  cyc le .  I n  
t h i s  scenar io the  s i x  normal main wheel brakes remain f u l l y  released. 
Although, i n  t h i s  acc ident  i t  i s  most l i k e l y  t h a t  e f f e c t i v e  b rak ing  would have 
been rea l i zed ,  i t  cannot be known s ince  t h e  p i l o t  e lec ted  t o  use minimum 
brak ing.  The Board f e e l s  t h a t  add i t i ona l  study i s  requ i red  i n  t h i s  area t o  
ensure t h a t  p i l o t s  have a good understanding o f  a n t i s k i d  brake system anomalies 
caused by f a i l e d  t i r e s .  
2.8 Cockpi t  Resource Management 
Another t r a i n i n g  program tha t  could have enhanced the  p i l o t ' s  dec is ion-  
making i n  recogniz ing and responding t o  t h e  hazard i n  t h i s  acc ident  scenar io 
i s  cockp i t  resource management (CRM). CRM r e f e r s  t o  t h e  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  a l l  
a v a i l a b l e  resources, whether i t  be in fo rmat ion ,  equipment, o r  people, t o  
achieve safe and e f f i c i e n t  f l i g h t  operat ions.  I t  inc ludes elements such as 
de legat ion  o f  tasks,  assessment o f  problems, use o f  a v a i l a b l e  data, communica- 
t i o n ,  and e f f e c t i v e  f l i g h t c r e w  coord inat ion.  
More e f f e c t i v e  communications between the  cockp i t  and the  a i r c r a f t  cabin,  
tower, o r  ground could have provided c r i t + : ~ l  ln fo I Inat ion t o  the  p i l o t  a t  an 
e a r l i e r  t ime. I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  dur ing the  t a k e o f f  r o l l  and be fore  the  f i r s t  
blowout some cabin occupants had noted several  abnormal i t ies  i n c l u d i n g  a "b lack 
o b j e c t "  f l y i n g  over the  wing and deformat ion o f  t i r e  3. Communication w i t h  
tower o r  ground dur ing  the takeof f  r o l l  could have a l e r t e d  the  p i l o t  t o  the 
seriousness o f  the  problem. The U.S. A i r  Force a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  waivered 
procedure o f  sw i tch ing  NASA 712 t o  depar ture c o n t r o l  frequency be fore  s t a r t i n g  
t h e  t a k e o f f  r o l l  was no t  i n  concert w i t h  t h e  accepted ATC p r a c t i c e  o f  having a 
t ranspor t  a i r c r a f t  swi tch t o  departure c o n t r o l  a f t e r  t a k e o f f .  As a r e s u l t  o f  
t h i s  frequency change and the  f l i g h t c r e w  n o t  mon i to r ing  t h e  c o n t r o l  tower f r e -  
quency, c a l l s  f rom the  tower c o n t r o l l e r  t h a t  NASA 712 was on f i r e  were no t  
heard by the  p i l o t .  Had the  p i l o t  known t h a t  t he  a i r c r a f t  was on f i r e ,  t he  
Board f e e l s  t h a t  h i s  ac t ions  m i g h t  have been d i f f e r e n t ,  i n c l u d i n g  s topping t h e  
a i r c r a f t  more qu ick l y .  The Board recnmmends t h a t  m i l i t a r y  a i r  t r a f f i c  con- 
t r o l l e r s  comply w i t h  t h e  procedures regard ing r a d i o  frequency changes as s ta ted  
i n  FAA A i r  T r a f f i c  Contro l  Manual 7110.65. I n  add i t i on ,  NASA f l i gh tc rews  
should moni tor  the  c o n t r o l l i n g  agency frequency du r ing  takeo f f .  
Because the  c r i t i c a l  nature and ex ten t  o f  the  opera t iona l  hazard was n o t  
Immediately obvious t o  the  f l i gh tc rew,  cockp i t  resource management t r a i n i n g  
could have enhanced the  p i l o t ' s  use o f  a l l  a v a i l a b l e  resources as w e l l  as the  
o ther  crewmembers' coord ina t ion  I n  a c t i v e l y  suppor t ing the  p i l o t  I n  assessing 
t h e  cond i t i on  o f  t he  a i r c r a f t  and i n  implementing a safe and successful  RTO. 
I n  recent  years CRM has been demonstrated s t a t i s t i c a l l y  t o  be s i g n i f i c a n t  
I n  c r i t i c a l  opera t ing  s i t u a t i o n s .  F o r  t h i s  reason many a i r l i n e s  have incorpo- 
ra ted  the  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  f l i g h t  deck resource management i n t o  t h e i r  t r a i n l n g  
programs. The USAF M i l i t a r y  A i r l l f t  Command (MAC) has s ta ted  t h a t  crew 
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coord ina t ion  and cockpi t  leadersh ip  a re  "two of t he  h o t t e s t  sub jec ts  i n  the  
command today." I n  1979, the  FAA issued an A i r  C a r r i e r  Operations B u l l e t i n  
i n s t r u c t i n g  a l l  p r i n c i p a l  operat ions inspectors  t o  urge t h e i r  assigned c a r r i e r s  
t o  inc lude CRM t r a i n i n g  i n  f l i g h t c r e w  programs. 
The Board feels t h a t  cockp i t  resource management could have helped t o  
opt imize f l i g h t c r e w  performance du r ing  t h i s  acc ident  sequence. 
t h a t  NASA incorporate CRM t r a i n i n g  i n t o  t h e i r  programs f o r  multicrewmember 
a i r c r a f t .  
I t  recomnends 
2.9 CFR Personnel Response 
The cu r ren t  CFR n o t i f i c a t i o n  network procedure, which requ i res  i n fo rma t ion  
regard ing the  nature of t he  emergency t o  be acqui red and recorded be fore  t h e  
CFR vehic les a re  dlspatched, i s  designed t o  respond t o  an a i rbo rne  emergency 
w i t h  p r e n o t i f i c a t i o n .  
a s t ructured,  announced f i r e  scenar io,  n o t  a dynamic unannounced emergency. 
Operators a re  cu r ren t l y  t r a i n e d  t o  gather  a l l  In fo rmat ion ,  t o  a l e r t  CFR per-  
sonnel, and then t o  d ispa tch  the  equipment. C r i t i c a l  t ime could be saved i f  
the  a l e r t  could take p lace  concur ren t ly  w i t h  pr imary crash n o t i f i c a t i o n  when 
an acc ident  has occurred w i thou t  p r e n o t i f i c a t i o n ,  as was the  case w i t h  the  
CV-990. The CFR response t ime could have been shortened by about 1 minute and 
22 seconds had the  alarm room operator  a l e r t e d  CFR personnel and dispatched 
the  equipment imnediately a f t e r  he had been n o t i f i e d  o f  t h e  emergency by t h e  
tower, a t  1810:28. 
I n  general, a larm room operator  procedures a r e  based on 
Response t i m e  could have been f u r t h e r  shortened by a t  l e a s t  1 5  seconds had 
the  a l e r t  been given when t h e  operator  f i r s t  became aware o f  t h e  emergency, 
t h a t  I s ,  a f t e r  t he  f i r s t  statement o f  t h e  tower n o t i f i c a t i o n .  The Board con- 
cludes t h a t  a larm room operator  a l e r t i n g  o f  CFR personnel should take  p lace  as 
soon as s u f f i c i e n t  i n fo rma t ion  i s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  con f i rm  t h a t  CFR response i s  
requ i red  t o  an emergency ac t i on .  
t ransmi t ted  a f t e r  the i n i t i a l  a l e r t i n g  a c t i o n  w h i l e  CFR response i s  under way. 
Fur ther  In fo rma t ion  can be gathered and 
The delay I n  the f i r e  a larm room communications center  cou ld  have been 
avoided. This delay d i d  no t  p lay  a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  i n  t h e  f i n a l  outcome 
because o f  t h e  f u l l y  invo lved running- fue l  f i r e .  However, i f  the  a i r c r a f t  had 
no t  been evacuated e f f e c t i v e l y ,  i t  could have been a s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r .  
Board be l ieves  t h a t  t h i s  de lay could have been prevented through procedural  
changes t o  f a c i l i t a t e  the  alarm room opera to r ' s  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t he  f i remen. 
The 
During t h i s  emergency event the re  was a r e l i e f  operator  i n  t h e  a larm room. 
Although he was t ra ined and q u a l i f i e d  f o r  t h a t  p o s i t i o n ,  h i s  pr imary du ty  was 
as the  designated d r i v e r  o f  t he  P-15 t ruck ,  and he r o u t i n e l y  had spent on ly  a 
few minutes a t  a time i n  the  alarm room as a r e l i e f  operator .  Also, a l though 
he had received i n s t r u c t i o n s  on procedures, he had n o t  had hands-on t r a i n i n g  
i n  alarm room a c t i v i t i e s  and had never handled an ac tua l  emergency. 
be l ieves t h a t  p r a c t i c i n g  several  d i f f e r e n t  alarm room scenarios i n  a hands-on 
fash ion  by designated r e l i e f  operators  would enhance response e f fec t i veness .  
The Board 
Since the  r e l i e f  operator was a l s o  the  d r i v e r  o f  t he  P-15 t ruck ,  t h i s  
major f i r e f i g h t i n g  veh ic le ,  which contained AFFF, was delayed i n  responding t o  
the  acc ident .  The Board f e e l s  t h a t  f i r e f i g h t e r s  assigned t o  c r i t i c a l  response 
p o s i t i o n s  should not be used as r e l i e f  operators.  
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2.10 F i r e  Contro l  
The AFFF used on t h i s  f i r e  was a 3 percent  concentrate and met M i l i t a r y  
Spec i f i ca t i on  F-243-85C. 
revealed t h a t  some c i v i l i a n  a i r p o r t s  use AFFF t h a t  meets UL Standard 162. 
Tes t i ng  a t  t he  FAA Technical Center's F i r e  Safety  Branch ind i ca ted  t h a t  on ly  a 
smal l  percentage o f  t he  t e s t  samples o f  a l l  types o f  f i r e f i g h t i n g  agents meet- 
i n g  UL Standard 162 could a l s o  meet t h e  t e s t  requirements o f  M i l i t a r y  Speci- 
f i c a t i o n  F-243-85C. The requirements f o r  M i l i t a r y  S p e c i f i c a t i o n  F-243-85C se t  
t h e  h ighes t  standards f o r  AFFF agents. I n v e s t i g a t i o n  a l s o  revealed t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  no n a t i o n a l  standard f o r  AFFF agents. 
In format ion gathered dur ing  the  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
Because o f  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  i n  f i r e f i g h t i n g  techniques, con t ro l ,  and sup- 
p ress ion  the re  was the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a catast rophe i n  t h i s  acc ident  had the  
19 occupants no t  evacuated as qu ick l y  and e f f e c t i v e l y  as they d id .  The Board 
i s  concerned about the  sa fe ty  of  occupants i n  s i m i l i a r  acc ident  scenarios and 
be l ieves  t h a t  g rea ter  emphasis should be placed on f i r e  c o n t r o l ,  suppression, 
and containment techniques. 
f i r e - r e t a r d a n t  ma te r ia l s  and s t r u c t u r a l  and cabin f i r e  p r o t e c t i o n  systems i n  
i t s  a i r c r a f t .  
I n  add i t ion ,  NASA should consider the  use o f  more 
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3 .O CONCLUSIONS 
3.1 Findings 
1. The crewmembers were proper ly  c e r t i f i e d  and q u a l i f i e d  f o r  t h e  f l i g h t  
i n  accordance w i t h  NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) p o l i c i e s .  
2. The a i r c r a f t  commander was occupying t h e  r i g h t  seat and per forming 
c o p i l o t  du t i es  f o r  t h i s  f l i g h t .  The assigned p i l o t  was seated i n  t h e  l e f t  
seat  making the  takeo f f .  
3. The a i r c r a f t  was operated as a p u b l i c  a i r c r a f t  and was maintained i n  
accordance w i t h  Convair 990 maintenance manuals and ARC procedures. 
t i o n s  t o  t h e  a i r c r a f t  had been made and approved i n  accordance w i t h  ARC a i r -  
worthiness requirements. 
Modi f ica-  
4. The a c t i v e  runway f o r  landing and takeo f f  a t  March A i r  Force Base 
(AFB),  runway 32, i s  300 f e e t  w i d e  by 13,300 f e e t  long. 
5. The runway was d ry  and the ou ts ide  temperature was 85 O F .  
6. The t a x i  d is tance from NASA 712's parked p o s i t i o n  on t h e  ramp t o  the  
depar ture end o f  runway 32 was 2.4 mi les .  
knots  . Average t a x i  speed was about 25 
7. The f l i g h t c r e w  completed t h e  before- takeof f  c h e c k l i s t ,  es tab l i shed 
takeof f  t h r u s t ,  and began the  takeof f  a t  approximately 1,000 f e e t  f rom t h e  
t a k e o f f  end o f  runway 32. 
8. The March AFB c o n t r o l  tower requested t h a t  NASA 712 swi tch  t o  
depar ture c o n t r o l  frequency before t a k e o f f .  
9. The cockp i t  crew was not mon i to r ing  March AFB c o n t r o l  tower o r  emer- 
gency frequencies du r ing  t h e  takeof f .  
10. The p i l o t ,  a f t e r  hearing two r a p i d  exp los ive  bangs and assoc ia t i ng  
them w i t h  a blown t i r e ,  re jec ted  t h e  t a k e o f f .  
deployed t h e  spo i le rs ,  and selected reverse t h r u s t  on a l l  engines. Reverse 
t h r u s t  was app l ied  about 14 seconds a f t e r  t he  p i l o t  heard t h e  f i r s t  exp los ive  
bang. 
He reduced t h r u s t  t o  i d l e ,  
11. The p i l o t  s ta ted  t h a t  he decided t o  use l i g h t  b rak ing  i n  view o f  t h e  
remaining runway, the  suspected blown t i r e  o r  t i r e s ,  and h i s  concern w i t h  keep- 
i n g  the  a i r c r a f t  a l i gned  on t h e  cen te r l i ne .  
12. The procedures ou t l i ned  i n  t h e  ARC f l i g h t  manuals a v a i l a b l e  t o  the  
p i l o t  do n o t  d i r e c t l y  address re jec ted  t a k e o f f s  w i t h  blown t i r e s  b u t  do s t a t e  
t h a t  b rak ing  should be used i n  r e j e c t i n g  a takeo f f .  
13. The a i r c r a f t  commander ( c o p i l o t )  d i d  n o t  ho ld  t h e  c o n t r o l  yoke 
forward du r ing  t h e  r o l l o u t .  
wheel reduced nose wheel s teer ing  e f fec t i veness .  
The r e s u l t i n g  l i g h t  corner ing  fo rces  on the  nose 
14. The  main gear t i r e s  had been properly in f la ted  and the brake systems 
were normal before the takeoff was rejected. 
15. The f i r s t  t i r e  anomaly was f a i lu re  of the casing on t i r e  3. The 
f i r s t  pieces of casing were found on the runway a t  about  1,400 fee t .  
cass blew a t  4,138 fee t ,  immediately a f t e r  t i r e  4 f a i l ed .  
4,125 f e e t  from overloading and heating. 
16. A t h i r d  t i r e  fa i led  a t  the no. 8 pos i t i on  a t  6,190 f ee t ,  2,065 feet  
The car-  
Tire 4 f a i l e d  a t  
a f t e r  t i r e  4 fa i led .  
debris.  
Tire 8 f a i l e d  from overloading or damage from wheel 
17. A f o u r t h  t i r e  f a i l ed  a t  the no. 7 p o s i t i o n  a t  7,300 feet ,  3,175 feet  
a f t e r  t i r e  4 fa i led ,  a l so  from overloading or damage from wheel debris. 
18. Tires 3, 4 ,  and 7 were 12 years old. Tire 8 was 9 years o ld .  Tires 
3 and 7 were 24-ply rated and t i r e s  4 and 8 were 22-ply rated. 
i t s  s i x t h  retread, t i r e s  4 and 7 on the i r  f o u r t h  retread, and t i r e  8 on i t s  
second retread. 
Tire 3 was on 
19. A right-wing fuel t a n k  was penetrated, most l i k e l y  between 6,000 and 
7,000 f ee t  down t h e  runway by an unknown o b j e c t .  
t h a t  t h e y  saw f i r e  on the a i r c r a f t  a t  about 7,000 f e e t ,  coinciding w i t h  the  
app l i ca t ion  of reverse t h r u s t .  
11,950 feet .  
Outside witnesses s ta ted 
The f i r s t  signs of f i r e  on the runway were a t  
20. The a i r c r a f t  was stopped a t  12,660 f ee t ,  640 f e e t  from the end of 
the runway and about 30 f e e t  t o  the r i g h t  of centerline. 
21. The forward and a f t  lef t -s ide a i r c r a f t  ex i t s  were opened, and the 
s l i des  were used by a l l  occupants t o  successfully evacuate the a i r c r a f t  i n  a 
timely manner. 
22.  The control tower operator completed n o t i f i c a t i o n  t o  the f i r e  depart- 
ment's alarm room operator  ( a  re l ie f  operator was on d u t y )  on the primary crash 
network a t  1810:28. The primary crash network was secured a t  1810:51, and the 
alarm room operator responded t o  the  secondary crash network a t  1810:55. 
secured the secondary crash network telephone and simultaneously aler ted crash/ 
f ire/rescue ( C F R )  personnel i n  the f i r e  s t a t i o n  a t  1811:SO. 
He 
23. The relief alarm room operator had neither experience i n  an emergency 
s i t u a t i o n  nor hands-on t r a in ing .  
C F R  vehicle ( a  P-15 truck).  
His primary d u t y  was as driver of a major 
24. There was an avoidable delay of 1 minute and 22 seconds i n  d i spa tch-  
i n g  f i r e  equipment. 
25. The f i r s t  CFR vehicle had traversed the 1.6 miles t o  the accident 
s i t e  and was engaged i n  f i r e f igh t ing  a t  1814:24, 3 minutes and 56 seconds a f t e r  
n o t i  f i ca t ion .  
26. During the f i r e f igh t ing  e f f o r t ,  1,915 gallons of aqueous film-forming 
foam ( A F F F )  and 59,000 gallons of water were expended. 
r igh t -wing  fuel supply was exhausted. 
The  f i r e  abated as the 
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27. Aircraft accident/incident statistics indicate that more rejected 
takeoffs are due to tire failures than to engine failures. 
28. 
the antiskid brake system even though it was not determined to be a factor in 
this accident. The CV-990 antiskid brake system has pressure control charac- 
teristics that pilots should be aware of when braking with failed tires. 
The Board along with Hydro-Aire engineers looked at the operation of 
3.2 Probable Cause 
The NASA Aircraft Accident Investigation Board determined that the prob- 
able cause o f  the accident was the nearly simultaneous failure of the two front 
tires on the right main landing gear at a critical time during the takeoff 
roll. These failures resulted in the pilot's decision to reject the takeoff. 
Contributing to the severity o f  the accident was an intense fire fed by leakage 
from the puncture of  a right-wing fuel tank forward o f  the right main gear; the 
puncture occurred during the intentional extended rollout of the aircraft. 
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4.0 SAFETY RECOHHENDATIONS 
As a result of its investigation of the Convair 990, NASA 712, accident 
of July 17, 1985, and a review of pertinent background documents and reports 
(appendix D ) ,  the NASA Aircraft Accident Investigation Board makes the 
following recomnendations. 
4.1 Federal Aviation Administration 
1. Require that flight manuals for large multiengine aircraft provide 
information on procedures for takeoff emergencies other than engine failure. 
This information should include guidance for continuing versus rejecting 
takeoff when an aircraft with all engines operating normally develops anomalies 
at high speed before reaching VI,  the speed at which a takeoff decision must 
be made. Factors such as directional control, tire failures, wheel rim fail- 
ures, antiskid braking characteristics, brake line vulnerability, and fuel tank 
and structural vulnerability to penetration could be considered. Hazard 
analyses and risk assessments for various scenarios could be discussed to 
provide background information for flightcrews to enhance their decision-making 
during takeoff emergencies. 
2. Require that flight manuals for large aircraft specify rejected- 
takeoff procedures involving tire failures and provide guidance on stopping 
procedures. Control yoke management procedures to enhance directional 
control, similar to guidance provided for takeoffs and landings, should be 
addressed. 
3. Sponsor a joint research effort with other appropriate Government 
agencies to improve firefighting capabilities for running-fuel "three 
d i men s i ona 1 'I f i res . 
4. Continue to research the characteristics of various aviation fire- 
fighting agents in order to identify the most effective agents and to establish 
a national standard for aviation firefighting agents. 
5. Provide additional emphasis to enhance compliance with the design 
criteria for aircraft structures and systems so as to locate fuel tank and 
other critical inspection plates on surface areas that are not vulnerable to 
debris from failed tires, wheels, and brake assemblies. 
6. Require that manufacturers review the antiskid braking system charac- 
teristics of large multiengine aircraft, with particular attention to multiple 
tire or wheel failures and their effect on system operation and overall braking 
effectiveness. Each manufacturer should provide operators with an analysis of 
the results of such reviews and suggested procedures for pilot response to 
tire/wheel failures. 
7. Review and amend, as necessary, the criteria established for the 
number of tire retreads permitted on a single carcass and for the removal of 
tires from service due to age or number of cycles. 
8. Encourage greater use o f  stronger wheels with roll-on-rim capability 
for transport category aircraft certified since 1979. 
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9. Review and modify cu r ren t  f l i g h t c r e w  requirements t o  i nc lude  t i m e l y  
t r a i n i n g  programs t h a t  adequately address t i r e ,  wheel, and brake problems dur-  
i n g  takeo f f .  Motion-based s lmulators  used i n  t h e  program should have models 
t h a t  p rov ide  r e a l i s t i c  t r a i n i n g  i n  t h e  r e c o g n i t i o n  and hand l ing  o f  such 
problems. 
10. Review and amend, as necessary, t h e  design c r i t e r i a  f o r  l a r g e  a i r -  
c r a f t  wheels and t i r e s  t o  preclude sympathetic t i r e  f a i l u r e s  occu r r i ng  a f t e r  
an i n i t i a l  s i n g l e  t i r e  f a i l u r e .  Considerat ions should i nc lude  heavyweight 
t akeo f f s  and landings. 
11. A l e r t  CV-990 operators o f  p o t e n t i a l  a n t i s k i d  f a i l u r e  modes t h a t  can 
r e s u l t  f rom loss  of  t w o  t i r e s  on the  same ax le .  Determine i f  any a n t i s k i d  
system w i t h  s i m i l a r  l o g i c  i s  operable on o ther  U.S. a i r c r a f t  and issue an 
a l e r t .  
4.2  Department o f  Defense 
1 .  Review and modify a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  procedures so t h a t  a l l  m i l i t a r y  
a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  towers comply w i t h  the  prov is ions  o f  Chapter 3 ,  Sect ion 9, 
Departure Contro l  I ns t ruc t i ons ,  FAA A i r  T r a f f i c  Cont ro l  Manual 7110.65. 
2. Review cur ren t  p r a c t i c e  t o  ensure t h a t  c rash / f i re / rescue procedures 
f o r  a larm room operators i nc lude  immediate a l e r t i n g  o f  f i r e f i g h t i n g  personnel 
i n  response t o  an unannounced emergency. 
3 .  Require tha t  f i r e f i g h t e r s  assigned t o  c r i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n s  be precluded 
from r e l i e f  operator assignment. 
4. Ensure t h a t  a l l  c rash / f i re / rescue alarm room operators  rece ive  
hands-on t r a i n i n g .  
4 .3  NASA Headquarters 
1 .  Sponsor a study w i t h  i ndus t r y  t o  assess the  hazards from blown t i r e s  
on heavy a i r c r a f t .  The study should consider t h e  fo l l ow ing :  
a. S u s c e p t i b i l i t y  o f  a i r c r a f t  s t r u c t u r e  and systems t o  damage 
b. Maximum brak ing  versus l i m i t e d  brak ing  
c .  Anomalies o f  a n t i s k i d  brake systems 
d. Cont inuing versus r e j e c t i n g  t a k e o f f  
2. Evaluate and develop t h e  requirement f o r  f l i g h t c r e w s  o f  l a r g e  NASA 
a i r c r a f t  t o  receive t r a i n i n g  i n  FAA Phase I1 o r  Phase I11 s imu la to rs  capable 
o f  p resent ing  r e a l i s t i c  f a i l e d - t i r e  models. 
3 .  Evaluate and e s t a b l i s h  a requirement f o r  i nco rpo ra t i on  o f  cockp i t  
resource management t r a i n i n g  i n t o  NASA f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  programs f o r  mul t ic rew- 
member a i r c r a f t .  
4. Es tab l i sh  gu ide l ines  r e q u i r i n g  t h a t  on ly  new t i r e s  o r  re t reads of 
NASA t i r e s  be used on NASA a i r c r a f t .  
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5 .  Develop NASA c r i t e r j a  f o r  t he  number of t i r e  re t reads permi t ted  on a 
s i n g l e  carcass and f o r  t h e  removal o f  t i r e s  f rom se rv i ce  because o f  age o r  
number o f  cycles.  
6. Es tab l i sh  gu ide l ines  requ i r i ng  t h a t  a l l  occupants o f  NASA a i r c r a f t  on 
research missions wear f l i g h t  s u i t s  made from appropr ia te  f i r e - r e t a r d a n t  
ma te r ia l s .  
7 .  Es tab l i sh  a p o l i c y  t o  ensure t h a t  o r i g i n a l  designs and manufacturers '  
b l u e p r i n t s ,  drawings, etc. ,  of unique equipment onboard NASA a i r c r a f t  du r ing  
research missions be re ta ined  a t  appropr ia te  ground f a c i l i t i e s .  
e x i s t i n g  copies o f  such mater ia ls  should n o t  be c a r r i e d  onboard NASA a i r c r a f t .  
The on ly  
4 . 4  NASA A i r c r a f t  Operations Managers 
1. Es tab l i sh  procedures f o r  r e j e c t e d  takeo f f s  t h a t  p a r a l l e l  accepted a i r  
c a r r i e r  i ndus t r y  p rac t i ces ,  w i t h  emphasis on the  use o f  maximum wheel b rak ing  
and c o n t r o l  yoke management. 
2. Review t h e  p r a c t i c a l i t y  o f  us ing  wheels w i t h  r o l l - o n - r i m  c a p a b i l i t y  
on appropr ia te  NASA a i r c r a f t  and, i f  feas ib le ,  implement t h e i r  use. 
3 .  Review t h e  cu r ren t  s ta tus o f ,  and need f o r ,  s t r u c t u r a l  and cabin f i r e  
p r o t e c t i o n  systems on NASA a i r c r a f t  and, where appropr ia te,  update those 
systems t o  i nco rpo ra te  modern de tec t ion  and suppression devices. 
4 .  Develop gu ide l i nes  t o  minimize t h e  use o f  t i r e s  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  p l y  
r a t i n g s  o r  t i r e s  produced by d i f f e r e n t  manufacturers on t h e  same a x l e  where 
d i f f e rences  i n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  between such t i r e s  can a f f e c t  t i r e  load ing  under 
normal opera t ing  cond i t i ons  ( s e e  Nat ional  Transpor ta t ion  Safety  Board Recom- 
mendation A-78-71, addressed t o  the Federal Av ia t i on  Admin is t ra t ion ,  dated 
9/6/78). 
5. Ensure t h a t  copies o f  pe r t i nen t  a i r c r a f t  opera t iona l  and maintenance 
logs  a re  re ta ined  a t  appropr ia te ground f a c i l i t i e s .  
6. Ensure t h a t  p r e f l i g h t  inspect ion records con ta in  the  measured t i r e  
pressures. 
7. Require t h a t  a l l  NASA f l igh tc rews moni tor  t h e  c o n t r o l l i n g  f a c i l i t y  
r a d i o  frequency o r  appropr ia te  emergency frequency du r ing  takeo f f .  
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APPENDIX A 
FLIGHTCREW INFORMATION 
A i r c r a f t  Comnander Gordon H. Hardy 
M r .  Hardy, age 52 a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  accident,  i assign d t o  tC.9 Research 
A i r c r a f t  Operations D iv is ion ,  NASA Ames Research Center, as a research p i l o t .  
He holds a i r l i n e  t ranspor t  p i l o t  c e r t i f i c a t e  1323097, dated 1/14/83. 
v a l i d  f i r s t - c l a s s  medical  c e r t i f i c a t e ,  issued 11/02/84, w i t h  the  l i m i t a t i o n  
t h a t  t he  holder  s h a l l  wear co r rec t i ve  lenses f o r  d i s t a n t  v i s i o n  and possess 
c o r r e c t i v e  lenses f o r  near v i s i o n  wh i l e  f l y i n g .  
He has a 
Mr .  Hardy completed a 40-hour CV-990 ground school on 1/10/83 and a i r c r a f t  
commander f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  on 1/14/83. 
been on 5/29/85. 
His  most recent  CV-990 f l i g h t  check had 
M r .  Hardy had about 7,816 f l y i n g  hours a t  t h e  t ime o f  t h e  accident,  
i n c l u d i n g  680 CV-990 f l y i n g  hours w i t h  380 hours as f i r s t  p i l o t .  
80 hours i n  t h e  prev ious 30 days, 32 hours as f i r s t  p i l o t  and 2 hours i n  t h e  
cv-990. 
He had f lown 
P i l o t  Eugene H. C a l l  
M r .  Ca l l ,  age 45 a t  t he  t ime of t h e  acc ident ,  i s  assigned t o  t h e  Research 
A i r c r a f t  Operations D iv i s ion ,  NASA Ames Research Center, as a support p i l o t .  
He holds a i r l i n e  t ranspor t  p i l o t  c e r t i f i c a t e  1521931, dated 4/5/85. 
v a l i d  f i r s t - c l a s s  medical c e r t i f i c a t e ,  issued 11/30/84, w i th  no l i m i t a t i o n s .  
He has a 
M r .  C a l l  completed a 40-hour CV-990 ground school on 8/4/83 and c o p i l o t  
His  mos t  recent  CV-990 f l i g h t  check had been on f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  on 1/26/84. 
5/29/85. 
M r .  C a l l  had about 7,850 f l y i n g  hours a t  t h e  t ime o f  t he  accident,  i nc lud -  
i n g  100 CV-990 f l y i n g  hours w i t h  23 hours as f i r s t  p i l o t .  
76 hours i n  t h e  prev ious 30 days, 44 hours as f i r s t  p i l o t  and 11 hours i n  the  
cv-990. 
He had f lown 
F l i g h t  Engineer Frank P. Kosik 
M r .  Kosik, age 39 a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t he  acc ident ,  i s  assigned t o  t h e  Research 
A i r c r a f t  Operat ion D iv i s ion ,  NASA Ames Research Center, as a f l i g h t  engineer. 
He holds a v a l i d  f i r s t - c l a s s  medical c e r t i f i c a t e  issued 8/8/85, w i t h  no 
l i m i t a t i o n s .  
M r .  Koslk completed a 40-hour CV-990 i n i t i a l  ground school i n  2/76 and 
f l i g h t  engineer f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  i n  3/76. 
t h e  t ime o f  t he  acc ident .  
He had about 4,000 f l y i n g  hours a t  
Navigator  Eugene A. Moniz 
M r .  Moniz i s  an employee o f  Northrop Services a t  NASA Ames Research Center 
and i s  assigned d u t i e s  as a navigator.  
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APPENDIX B 
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION 
Convair CV-990, serial no. N712NA (Comnercial 30-10-37) had been manufac- 
tured on 6/27/61. 
when it had 8,199 flight hours. 
as a public aircraft according to the manufacturer's procedures and recomnen- 
dations. At the time of the accident the aircraft had accumulated 12,104 
flight hours and logged 4,974 landings. 
and the 50-hour check had been done 27 flight hours before the accident, and 
the annual inspection had been completed in 2/85. 
NASA Ames Research Center acquired the aircraft on 12/10/73, 
It was registered by the FAA and maintained 
The last major inspection (250 hours) 
Maintenance Records Reviewed 
(1) Convair Model 30 Maintenance Manuals 
(2) Convair Model 30 Structural Repair Manual 
(3) Convair Model 30 Operations Manual 
(4) Preflight Form RSI43 
(5) Postflight Form FOI45 
(6) Inspection and Modification Discrepancies Form OAW-78 
(7) Form 781-0A-3 
(8) Form 781-0A-4 
(9) Aircraft Delayed Discrepancy and Special Inspection Record, FOI3 
(1 0) Removal Record Form, 781 -0A-10 
(11 )  Aircraft Inspection and Operating Time Data Record, 781-OA-6 
(12) DD Form 3658, Weight and Balance 
Engines: General Electric. CJ805-236 
Engine Serial Date o f  Time of Total 
no. instal- instal- time, 
lation lation, hours 
hours 
1 175-1 37 1 /09/85 21 9 382 
2 41 4-1 82 7/02/85 3432 3455 
3 41 4-1 29 8/08/83 338 1140 
4 41 4-1 89 3/10/85 4836 4994 
Nose Tires 
Position Serial Date of Number of 
no. installation landings 
Left 0544 04/15/85 18 
Right 0565 04/15/85 18 
Brakes 
P o s i t i o n  Serial  
no. 
BO394 
( a )  
BO736 
BO299 
BO41 2 
BO1 17 
BO733 
BO726 
Date of Date of 
manufacture ins ta l la t ion  
( a )  
( a )  
( a )  
( a )  
12/14/61 
04/04/61 
12/14/61 
12/14/61 
01 /29/85 
08/08/84 
10/01/84 
10/01/84 
05/30/85 
10/01/84 
01 /04/85 
( a )  
Wnknown. 
Service History of Right  Main Landing Gear Tires 
Tire 3, se r ia l  no. 335MV443, was 24-ply rated and had been manufactured 
by Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company i n  9/73. T h e  t i r e  had been retreaded s ix  
times, the l a s t  by Thompson Aircraf t  Tire Corporation i n  6/81. The wheel and 
t i r e  assembly had been instal led on the a i r c r a f t  on 8/8/84. 
experienced 140 landings since i t s  l a s t  retread, and approximately 2/32 i n c h  
of tread groove d e p t h  remained. 
The  t i r e  had 
Tire 4 ,  ser ia l  no. 3313348, was 22-p ly  rated and had a l s o  been manufac- 
One d i g i t  was missing from the ser ia l  number i d e n t i f y i n g  tured by Goodyear. 
the date  of manufacture. The  fourth retread had been by Thompson i n  12/84; so 
the t i r e  was probably manufactured i n  1973 rather than 1983. 
t i r e  assembly had been ins ta l led  on the a i r c r a f t  on 3128/85. 
experienced 45 landings since i t s  l a s t  retread, and approximately 8/32 i n c h  of 
tread groove d e p t h  remained. 
The wheel and 
The t i r e  had 
Tire 7 ,  ser ia l  no. 342NJ1267, was 24-ply rated and had been manufactured 
by Goodyear i n  10/73. 
wheel and t i r e  assembly had been instal led on the a i r c r a f t  on 8/22/84. The 
t i r e  had experienced 131 l a n d i n g s  since i t s  l a s t  retread, and approximately 
3/32 i n c h  of tread groove d e p t h  remained. 
The fou r th  retread had been by Thompson i n  2/84. The 
Tire 8, ser ia l  no. 63000171, was 22-ply rated and had been manufactured 
by Goodrich Tire and Rubber Company i n  10/76. 
Thompson i n  3/84. 
c r a f t  on 3/28/85. The t i r e  had 45 landings since i t s  l a s t  retread, and 
9/32 inch of tread groove d e p t h  remained. 
T h e  second retread had been by 
The wheel and t i r e  assembly had been instal led on the a i r -  
I t  i s  NASA ARC policy t o  change t i r e s  when tread groove i s  n o t  v i s ib le  on 
any  par t  of the  t i r e ,  when the tread has been c u t  t o  the co rd ,  or when there 
i s  a c u t  i n  the  sidewall. 
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APPENDIX C 
COCKPIT V O I C E  RECORDER TRANSCRIPT 
Symbols 
CAM-1 P i l o t ,  l e f t  cockpit  seat 
CAM-2 A i r c r a f t  commander, r i g h t  cockpqt seat 
CAM-3 F l i g h t  engineer 
Tower March AFB cont ro l  tower 
( * )  Nonpertinent word or phrase 
(?) Questionable source o r  word 
Transcr ip t  
Time, 
nin:sec 
1806:29 
1806:33 
1806:35 
1806:4( 
1806:4: 
1806 : 4; 
Source 
712 
71 2 
71 2 
CAM-1 
CAM-3 
CAM-2 
CAM-3 
CAM-3 
CAM-2 
CAM-3 
CAM-2 
CAM-3 
CAM-3 
CAM-3 
Cockpi t  conversat ion 
Be fo re - tax i  check l i s t  completed. 
P re takeo f f  check1 i s t  completed. 
STAB s e t t i n g  4.2. 
V i  - 151. 
VR - 154. 
80-knot check. 
Abort  b r i e f i n g  . 
I f  we've got  t o  abort, we've got  
p l e n t y  o f  runway. Don't f o rge t  
t h e  spo i l e rs .  Remind me t o  qe t  
t h e  spo i l e rs .  Stop the (*) 
s t r a i g h t  ahead. I f  we g e t  
a i rborne,  I'll f l y  the a i r p l a n e  
w i t h  the  r i g h t  s i d e  up. 
procedures, I ' l l  explain. S tay  
VFR. Take care o f  whatever i t  
says i n  the  book. 
Before- takeof f  check l i s t  
complete. Hold ing on f i n a l  
i tem. 
Any 
712 p o s i t i o n  and hold. 
F i n a l  i t em a n t i s k i d  on. 
Transponder. 
Transponder on. 
Running l i g h t s .  
Running l i g h t s  on. 
Very end. 
F i n a l  i t em complete. 
Do you want me t o  help you Set 
the  power? 
__ 
,ource 
- 
ower 
Tower __ 
__ 
Comnunication 
Cleared t o  t a x i .  
NASA 712 t a x i  i n t o  p o s i t i o n  and hold.  
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Time, 
min:sec 
1807: 05 
1807: 13 
1807: 16 
1807:18 
1807 :22 
1807 : 24 
1807 : 27 
1807:32 
1807 : 43 
1807: 51 
1807:55 
1808: 01 
1808:04 
1808:09 
1808:lO 
1808: 20 
1808:20 
1808: 21 
1 808: 23 
1808:40 
1808:54 
1 1808:57 I 
ource 
AM-2 
AM- 1 
AM-1 (? )  
AM-3 
AM-1 
AM-2 
AM-2 
AM-3 
AM-1 
:AM-3 
CAM-1 
:AM-1 
,AM-3 
,AM-3 
CAM-3 
( ? I  
CAM-3 ( ? 1 
CAM-3 
Cockpit conversation 
lust re lax.  
e l  axed. 
'h is  i s  a heavyweight takeof f .  
ou b e t t e r  ge t  psyched up a 
i t t l e .  
'eh, we're using 10,000 f t  o f  
unway. Think I ' m  k idding, huh? 
le ' re  gonna get r o l l i n g  on 
h i s  (*) 
Laughter) 
:eep relaxed. 
s t h a t  an a i rp lane down there?  
:s  i t  a h i l l  o r  something? Look 
it tha t .  
'hat 's an ACM ( ? )  
-h is  may be my..... (*) 
I'll t e l l  you what, you b e t t e r  no 
crash because t h i s  whole cockp i t  
i s  going t o  be f u l l  o f  i c e  cream. 
I t ' l l  he lp  douse t h e  f i r e .  
If we get any r e a l  (*), j u s t  s ta r '  
dumping t h e  gas. 
Yeh, don ' t  even worry about 
tu rn ing  back. 
word and i t ' l l  be done. 
I n  fac t ,  I ' m  gonna... 
Jus t  g i ve  me the  
Want me t o  se t  127.35 w i t h  i t?  
(Sound o f  engine spoolup) 
Ready? 
(Engine sound s t a b i l i z e s )  
T I .  - -.& 
I vc ~ C L  the  puiei-. 
There's 80 knots.  
- 
,ource 
ower 
:AM-2 
Comnunication 
NASA 712, Tower, t r a f f i c  i s  a C-135 
e x i t i n g  t h e  runway a t  departure end. 
Wind th ree  zero zero a t  f i v e .  
t o  departure; c leared  f o r  takeoff .  
Change 
712 cleared f o r  t akeo f f .  
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Time, 
min:sec 
1809:04 
1809:14 
1809: 16 
1809: 18 
1809:19 
1809: 20 
1809:24 
1809: 26 
1809:28 
1809: 29 
1809:33 
1809: 43 
1809:50 
1809: 57 
1810:Ol 
1810:04 
1810:07 
1810:08 
1810:lO 
1810:15 
1810: 17 
1810:21 
1810:24 
1810:24 
181 0:30 
1810:34 
1810:39 
Source 
.- __ 
CAM-3(?) 
CAM-2 
CAM-3 
CAM-2 
CAM-1 
CAM-3 
CAM-3 
CAM-2 
CAM-2 
CAM-1 
CAM-2 
CAM-3 
Mission 
Manager 
CAM-2 
CAM- 1 
CAM-2 
Cockpit Conversation 
They're a l l  se t t i ng  on 187. 
(Two r a p i d  explosive sounds) 
Abort. 
Blown t i r e .  (simultaneous) 
(Sound o f  engine spooldown) 
T i re .  
I'm gonna s tay  o f f  t he  brakes. 
They ' l l  have l i t t l e  e f f e c t .  
(Explosive sound) 
Blew another one. 
(Sound o f  engine spoolup - 
reversers) 
(Explosive sound) 
3000 f t  
(Sound o f  engine spooldown) 
Well, how about tha t?  
We kept them apples ... 
I t h ink  i t  was the  l e f t  side. 
I t h ink  we blew two. 
Yeh, oh yeh ... 
- 
F i r e  on the  r i g h t  side. 
We have a f i r e  on the r i g h t  side. 
... We' l l  j u s t  stop ... L e t ' s  j u s t  
stop r i g h t  here... 
Le t ' s  shut'em down. 
(Sound o f  engine shutdown) 
(End o f  record ing)  
Source 
CAM-2 
NASA 
ground 
CAM-2 
Depart- 
t u r e  
Control  
Comnunication 
NASA 712 i s  abort ing.  
Casey, you ' re  on f i r e .  
NASA 712 unable t o  t a x i .  
NASA 712, you have Departure 
Control. Report a i rborne  please. 
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APPENDIX D 
LISTING OF SUPPORTING INTERVIEWS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS 
PLACED IN ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT DOCKET6 
Interview Transcripts 
A. Flightcrew 
1. Gordon H. Hardy, ARC Aircraft Commander 
2. Eugene H. Call, ARC Pilot 
3. Frank P. Kosik, ARC Flight Englneer 
4. Eugene A. Moniz, Northrop Navigator 
B. Scientists/Technicians 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
John 0. Reller, ARC Mission Manager 
Glen E. Frenzel, Northrop Electronics Technician 
John 8. Graybeal, Informatics Computer Technician 
Susan D. Brooks, Northrop Data Recorder 
Susan C. Cherniss, Informatics Computer Technician 
Thomas W. Thompson, JPL Data Recorder 
James R. Horvat, Northrop Technician 
Elmer S. McMillan, JPL Radar Engineer 
Tim Miller, JPL Radar Technician 
William R. Fiechter, JPL Radar Technician 
C. Witnesses 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
Doug McKinnon, Northrop Deputy Resident Manager 
Steve Davis, Northrop NASA 712 Crew Chief 
TSgt Paul Hasty, USAF March AFB Control Tower 
SSgt Maynard Harris, USAF March AFB Control Tower 
Airman First Class Jody Green, USAF March AFB Control Tower 
SSgt Dennis Wigger, USAF KC-135 Crew Chief 
SrA Michael Gronski, USAF KC-135 Mechanic 
MSgt Daniel Carter, USAF Maintenance Supervisor 
MSgt Steve Johnson, USAF Maintenance Supervisor 
MSgt Bernie A. Livengood, USAF Maintenance Supervisor 
Major John Pence, USAF KC-135 Pilot 
SMSgt Barber, USAF KC-135 Boom Operator 
SSgt Christopher L. Pittman, USAF KC-135 Maintenance 
SSgt Ferguson, USAF Instrument Technician 
Sgt Robert S. Bruce, Jr., USAF Avionics TechnicIan 
Sgt Randy Peters, USAF KC-135 Crew Chief 
Sgt Catherine Villareal, USAF KC-135 Maintenance 
TSgt Steve Rose, USAF Maintenance Supervisor 
Kenneth Bull, USAF Disaster Preparedness Office 
Number of 
pages 
8 
22 
19 
12 
20 
9 
15 
4 
3 
7 
7 
21 
12 
8 
12 
16 
6 
5 
6 
5 
10 
6 
1 1  
21 
9 
5 
3 
5 
3 
5 
5 
4 
1 1  
6Located in NASA Headquarters Aircraft Management Office. 
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Number of 
pages 
20. TSgt Jackie Byrth, USAF Security Police 
21. Fred 3. Drinkwater, 111, Chief Ames Research Operations 
Divi si on 
Reports and Documents 
A. Flight Operations Plan - Flight Itinerary and Passenger Manifest 
8. Maintenance and Inspection Records 
1. Calendar and Hourly Item Inspection Record 
2. Flightcrew Training Records 
C. Parts Teardown Reports 
1. Transportation Systems Center Tire Inspection Report 
2. Thompson Aircraft Corporation Tire Inspection Report 
3. Wheel Brake Examination 
4. Wing Penetration Report 
5. General Dynamics Tire/Wing Impact Report 
D. Laboratory Reports 
1. USAF Official Weather Observation 
2. FBI Paint Analysis Report 
3. NTSB Flight Data Recorder Readout 
4. Toxicological Reports 
E .  Photographs, Film, and Videotape 
F .  Communications/Recordings/Transcriptions 
1. March AFB Control Tower/NASA 712 
2. Crash/Fire/Rescue 
6. Additional Substant 
1. Aircraft Tire 
2. NASA 712 Main 
3. FAA AC 145-4, 
5. FAA Notice of 
6. Parts of FAA 
4. FAA T S O - C ~ ~ C ,  
ating Data/Reports/Analyses 
Construct i on 
Landing Gear 
Ai rcraf t Ti res 
Aircraft Tires With Addendum 1 
Proposed Rule Making, Part 91, Airplane Tires 
0-78-133, Improvement of Air Carrier 
Aircraft Ti res 
7. Allied Bendix Nonfrangible Wheels 
8. Convair Traveler, May/June 1963, Antiskid Systems 
9. Hydro-Aire Antiskid Maintenance 
10. NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System Report: Tire 
11. Swissair letter with checklists and information 
Fai 1 ures 
concerning RTO's 
5 
8 
2 
3 
13 
13 
4 
5 
5 
2 
1 
1 
10 
9 
19 
4 
2 
7 
18 
13 
4 
20 
5 
16 
12 
30 
27 
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Number o f  
pages 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
McDonnell-Douglas D C - i 0  Newsletter: RTO 12 
TWA Remarks: Windshear - RTO 7 
French Nat iona l  Academy Report: Overrun on Landings 
and RTO's 11 
McDonnell-Douglas DC-10 RTO S t a t i s t i c s  5 
A i r  L ine  P i l o t s  Associat ion RTO Procedures 4 
NASA RTO Survey 1 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C i v i l  Av la t ion  Organizat ion RTO Overrun 
Acc i dents 8 
FAA F l i g h t  T ra in ing  Requirements 1 
Phase I 1  and I11 Simulator L l s t  1 
F l i g h t  Safety  Foundation Paper on R e a l i s t i c  T ra in ing  
f o r  A i r l l n e  Crews 16 
Excerpts f rom NASA Ames Research Center CV-990 F l i g h t  Manuals 6 
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